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Luck v. Justice: 
Consent Intervenes, but for Whom? 
Jennifer W. Reynolds* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Does consent in alternative dispute resolution (ADR) provide a 
rebuttable presumption of justice?1  To the extent that justice is not arbitrary 
or random or subject to the vagaries of chance—put another way, to the 
extent that justice is immune to luck—the answer would seem to be yes.2  
Consent freely given implies that the proposed arrangement is fair, based on 
the parties’ own valuations of costs and benefits and regardless of what 
happened (intentionally or not) to arrive at the arrangement.3  This 
understanding of consent legitimates the inclusion of alternative processes 
 
*Assistant Professor, University of Oregon School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School; M.A., 
University of Texas at Austin; A.B., University of Chicago.  I am thankful to the wonderful student 
editors of the Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal for their help.  I greatly appreciate Ann 
Aiken, Erik Girvan, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Lela Love, Arthur Miller, Michael Moffitt, and Nancy 
Welsh for comments on earlier drafts.  Warm thanks to Peter Carlson, Chloe Goodgame, Jason 
Ormsby, and Roma Pawelek for their wonderful research assistance.  Finally, I am grateful for the 
support of Dean Moffitt and the University of Oregon School of Law. 
 1. Here, “consent” means freely agreeing both to process and to outcome, see infra Part IIIA 
and IIIB, and I am using “justice” in the broadest and most ordinary way. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, 
JUSTICE AS FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT 5 (Erin Kelly ed., 2001) (stating the “fundamental idea of 
society as a fair system of cooperation”); Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediation and Justice: What 
Standards Govern?, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 213, 213 (2005) (noting that “each of us can 
readily describe situations that instantly appall us for reasons that we intuitively identify as 
constituting acts or occasions of injustice”).  This stance is complicated, of course, by differences in 
subjective understandings of justice.  See, e.g., Ellen Waldman, The Concept of Justice in Mediation: 
A Psychobiography, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 247 (2005) (arguing that theories of justice are 
informed by personal experiences). 
 2. As described in Part II, moral luck philosophers “challenged the alleged immunity of 
morality to luck” and thus raised questions of “responsibility, justification, blame, and so forth” that 
implicate justice.   See Daniel Statman, Introduction, in MORAL LUCK 2 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993). 
 3. See, e.g., Jonathan M. Hyman & Lela P. Love, If Portia Were a Mediator: An Inquiry into 
Justice in Mediation, 9 CLINICAL L. REV. 157, 158 (2002) (“Unlike a judge, jury or arbitrator, a 
mediator does not have the responsibility to determine an appropriate remedy or a just distribution. 
That is for the parties themselves to do.”). 
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such as mediation in the legal system.4 In fact, one might go further and 
argue that because of consent, processes such as mediation outperform the 
traditional legal system in terms of delivering justice free from luck 
distortions. Consent ensures that the parties themselves are the final 
determinants of what is fair5—not the luck of the draw with which judge 
hears the case, or who among the parties happens to have more money, or 
how arbitrary legislative line-drawing allows for this but not that, or any 
other external variabilities that might affect the outcome but have really 
nothing to do with the parties or the dispute. 
Thinking about consent this way is appealing but wrong.  The thinking 
is wrong for many reasons, among them that this formulation of consent fails 
to appreciate how consent and luck actually interact in ADR settings and 
what the dangerous justice implications of that interaction might be. 
This Article argues that consent in ADR works to make luck invisible 
without necessarily making luck go away.  Invisible luck in consent-based 
processes, especially at the low end of the civil justice market, threatens 
access to justice not only by exposing participants to unjust or indefensible 
outcomes but also by holding them responsible for those very outcomes.6  
This double whammy undermines both the historical inclusiveness of 
American civil procedure7 as well as the foundational ADR precepts of self-
 
 4. See, e.g., Carrie Menkel-Meadow, From Legal Disputes to Conflict Resolution and Human 
Problem Solving: Legal Dispute Resolution in a Multidisciplinary Context, 54 J. LEGAL EDUC. 7, 22 
(2004) [hereinafter Multidisciplinary Context] (noting the parties’ own consented-to agreements 
have “greater legitimacy and longevity” than they would if “commanded from on high”); see also 
James Coben & Penelope Harley, Intentional Conversations About Restorative Justice, Mediation 
and the Practice of Law, 25 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 235, 329 (2004) (describing some 
panelists as “caustic in their characterization of justice delivered by the traditional legal system”); 
John Lande, Getting the Faith: Why Business Lawyers and Executives Believe in Mediation, 5 
HARV. NEGOTIATION L. REV. 137, 190-92 (2000) (suggesting that mediation promotes greater 
process clarity that in turn makes it easier to “rationaliz[e] settlements to clients”). 
 5. See, e.g., Hyman & Love, supra note 3; see also Katherine R. Kruse, Learning from 
Practice: What ADR Needs from a Theory of Justice, 5 NEV. L.J. 389 (2004-2005) (arguing that 
ADR should be informed by theories of deliberative democracy and especially the “normative 
concept of ‘authentic participation’”). 
 6. See Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Court Mediation and the Search for Justice Through Law, 
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 47, 66 (1996) [hereinafter Search for Justice] (describing the “hit or miss type of 
justice” that occurs in small claims mediation contexts); see also Nancy A. Welsh, Remembering the 
Role of Justice in Resolution: Insights from Procedural and Social Justice Theories, 54 J. LEGAL 
EDUC. 49, 50 (2004) [hereinafter Just Resolutions] (warning dispute resolution proponents that 
“there can be no real or lasting resolution unless sufficient attention is paid to justice”). 
 7. See, e.g., Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials on 
the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 288 
(2013) (“[T]he distinguished proceduralists who drafted the Federal Rules believed in citizen access 
to the courts and in the resolution of disputes on their merits, not by tricks or traps or obfuscation.”) 
(citations omitted).  Professor Miller compellingly demonstrates how recent Supreme Court 
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determination and autonomy,8 and thus threatens to deteriorate public 
confidence and reduce social welfare in both arenas.9 Such deterioration 
becomes even more problematic as we continue scaling dispute resolution 
and complex decision-making to broader public contexts in which we strive 
for consensus and then expect post-decision compliance.10  Accordingly, we 
must become more sophisticated in how we understand and communicate 
what consent means to those who participate in consent-based processes.  If 
we do not, then alternative dispute resolution proponents have no hope of 
supporting a meaningfully engaged democratic community. 
Note that there are many potential entry points to a discussion of 
fictional consents in alternative contexts.  Consent-based civil processes are 
everywhere.  The broad thesis of this Article is that all forms of civil consent 
are susceptible to luck distortions.  That said, the integrity of these consents 
certainly varies across contexts.  On one end of the spectrum is the adhesive 
contract, certainly the most notorious example of consent fictions in ADR.11  
 
jurisprudence, such as the latest cases on personal jurisdiction and pleading, has raised the bar to 
unmanageable heights for many plaintiffs, thus curtailing public access to justice.  See id. at 358.  
These developments on traditional civil litigation put more pressure on alternative dispute resolution 
mechanisms, such as mediation, and may actually make these mechanisms less effective.  See Nancy 
A. Welsh, I Could Have Been a Contender: Summary Jury Trial as a Means To Overcome Iqbal’s 
Negative Effects upon Pre-Litigation Communication, Negotiation and Early, Consensual Dispute 
Resolution, 114 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1149, 1156 (2010) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s recent 
pleading opinions discourage would-be defendants from engaging with “marginalized claimants”). 
 8. See infra discussion in Part IIIA. 
 9. “[C]onsent has the effect of confining responsibility for ill fortune under the contract to the 
unlucky party alone.” Aditi Bagchi, Managing Moral Risk: The Case of Contract, 111 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1878, 1913 (2011). 
 10. For example, in international mediation, process leaders attempt to bring parties together 
to make agreements that require not only in-the-moment consent but a real commitment to post-
agreement implementation.  As Melanie Greenberg points out, because these agreements take place 
in “the shadow of weak international law,” the expressed consent of the parties is not meaningful 
unless there is intention behind it.  Melanie Greenberg, Consent in International Mediation, 14 No. 2 
DISP. RESOL. MAG. 20 (2008). 
 11. Adhesion terms may specify, for example, that a consumer or employee has “consented” 
to waiving dispute resolution choices in favor of an often limited form of arbitration (for example, 
arbitration with no class form available). There is a significant literature on consent fictions in the 
context of arbitration and compulsory mediation.  Arbitration “is a matter of consent, not coercion,” 
Volt Information Sciences, Inc. v. Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior University, 489 U.S. 
468, 479 (1989), yet the quality of that consent has come under attack, particularly in recent years 
given mandatory arbitration developments in consumer and employment contexts.  See, e.g., Jean 
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STANFORD L. REV. 1631, 1645-46 
(2005) (“[W]hile there are some exceptions, for the most part courts have held that even illiterate or 
blind consumers or employees can be bound by unsigned small print arbitration notices”); see also 
David S. Schwartz, Mandatory Arbitration and Fairness, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1247 (2009) 
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On the other end of the spectrum is the negotiation at arms’ length, as 
between corporations, which at least appears to involve the greatest exercise 
of true agency and therefore the least fictional consents.  This Article 
focuses on the unrepresented alternative processes, such as small claims 
mediation, that fall in between these two poles.  How we think about 
“minor” court-connected processes may have considerable impact larger 
civic concerns (such as individual legal consciousness or the quality of 
participation in democratic society) as well as informing policy- and system-
based decisions around whether and how alternative consent-based 
processes can be successfully deployed, as a matter of justice, in other 
contexts.12 
This Article proceeds from here in four Parts.  Part Two starts with a 
familiar puzzle in ADR scholarship: can a consented-to agreement be 
unjust?  This is not a new question, and as such there are many possible 
avenues for analysis.13 This Part contributes to the conversation by 
introducing the moral and jurisprudential conceptions of “luck” to 
alternative theory and practice.  Scholars have examined moral and legal 
luck in criminal law, torts, and contracts, but not in ADR.14  Thinking about 
luck in ADR is analytically useful in two ways: one, by showing how 
consent becomes less meaningful as the wide variance of external and 
internal inputs in alternative processes becomes evident; and two, by making 
clear that ADR processes are designed to leverage luck itself—serendipity 
 
(arguing that mandatory arbitration is not as fair as litigation); Christopher J. Kippley & Richard A. 
Bales, Extending OWBPA Notice and Consent Protections to Arbitration Agreements Involving 
Employees and Consumers, 8 NEV. L.J. 10 (2007) (offering ideas to make consent to arbitration 
more informed).  Compulsory mediation has also garnered criticism.  See, e.g., Matthew Parrott, Is 
Compulsory Court-Annexed Medical Malpractice Arbitration Constitutional? How the Debate 
Reflects a Trend Towards Compulsion in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2685 
(2007); Stephan Landsman, ADR and the Cost of Compulsion, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1593 (2005) 
(arguing that compulsory ADR may further disenfranchise structurally weak parties). 
 12. My thanks to Arthur Miller for his helpful comments on this point. 
 13. Some scholars approach this problem from the standpoint of mediation and justice.  See, 
e.g., Omer Shapira, Conceptions and Perceptions of Fairness in Mediation, 54 S. TEX. L. REV. 281 
(2012); Stulberg, supra note 1; Paul Clark, Restorative Justice and ADR: Opportunities and 
Challenges, 44 NOV. ADVOCATE 13 (2001) (arguing that justice in the restorative justice context 
comes from conflict resolution that is relationship-centered, not punishment-centered); Nancy A. 
Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got To Do with It?, 79 WASH. 
U. L.Q. 787 (2001) (suggesting reform is needed to ensure procedural justice from the parties’ 
perspectives).  Others examine the coercion that mediators can exert on participants.  See sources 
cited infra note 22. 
 14. See, e.g., Bagchi, supra note 9 (contracts); Richard A. Epstein, Decentralized Responses to 
Good Fortune and Bad Luck, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 309 (2008) (property); Jules Coleman & 
Arthur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91 (1996) (torts); Joel Feinberg, Equal 
Punishment for Failed Attempts: Some Bad but Instructive Arguments Against It, 37 ARIZ. L. REV. 
117 (1995) (criminal law). 
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and synergy, for example, are unpredictable dynamics that alternative 
process designers attempt to harness in support of creative and arguably 
more just resolution of disputes. Adjustments to mediation and other ADR 
processes, accordingly, should avoid ruling out the possibility of flexible 
process, expansive problem definitions, and innovative solutions. 
Part Three examines whether consent can effectively mitigate bad luck 
effects in ADR.  Given the relative lack of procedural safeguards and 
professional accountability of process guides (such as mediators), many 
alternative designs rely on party consent as the arbiter of whether a 
particular process or outcome is fair.  This Part tests the soundness of that 
design assumption and concludes that overreliance on “consent” in modern 
alternative processes is problematic as a matter of justice, even as it appears 
to offer the greatest expression of unfettered agency. 
Part Four is prescriptive and accordingly seeks forward-looking actions 
that can strengthen consent in civil regimes without debilitating the 
transformative potential of alternative processes.  In the past, scholars have 
suggested ideas that fall into two broad categories: one, improving mediator 
quality (and thus diminishing luck effects associated with getting a “bad” 
mediator) and two, improving the mediation context (and thus diminishing 
luck effects associated with existing legal doctrine, lack of information, 
confusing background rules, and time pressures).  This Article reviews these 
suggestions and then adds another category: improving participant quality, 
in advance of private dispute resolution or large-scale public decision-
making and beyond just better “inputs” through mediator and context 
improvements.  Improving participant quality sounds straightforward but 
involves considerable disruption to established norms around the 
responsibilities of professional gatekeepers and the role of law schools more 
generally.  Law schools have trained mediators, process leaders, and system 
designers for decades.  Now, as traditional processes continue to give way to 
ADR and as large-scale deliberation of complex public problems becomes 
more pressing, perhaps law schools should take up the challenge to teach 
community members how to participate in consent-based deliberative 
processes. 
II.  THE LUCK PROBLEM IN CIVIL SETTLEMENTS 
Ms. P, a retired woman living alone, hires Mr. Q to install a new garage 
door at her home.  Q installs a dented, obviously used door for P that scrapes 
the garage ceiling every time it goes up or down.  He slathers grease along 
the chain and some ends up on the garage ceiling.  P is unhappy with both 
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the door and the installation and refuses to pay.  Q files a civil complaint.  P 
is nervous about her first time before a judge—and as a defendant!—and so 
upon arriving at the courthouse alone on the day of the hearing, decides to 
ask the clerk about mediation.  The clerk calls Q to the desk.  Q agrees to 
mediate.  So M, a mediator affiliated with the “Justice Center” (the 
organization providing small claims mediation services to the court), brings 
P and Q into a small conference room.  After going through the typical 
mediation preamble, M moves P and Q into separate rooms for caucus. 
During his caucus with P, M says: “Q has a good case.  He’s been here 
before.  Think hard about settling.”  M then disappears.  Later, when M 
brings the parties back together, Q states that P should pay for the garage 
door plus interest.  P agrees.  Then P adds, suddenly: “And I want you to 
come pick up your door and take it away, for free.”  Q agrees.  M draws up 
the agreement.  A week later, when Q comes to pick up the garage door, he 
makes a point of gleefully telling P that door is worth $500.  Q then loads 
the door into his truck and drives away, honking twice and waving out the 
window.  P, who has already paid to have Q’s door removed from the garage 
and a new door installed, watches him go. 
Maybe not a perfect small claims mediation, but hardly terrible.  Two 
parties dispute over a low-dollar matter, head toward small claims court, 
divert themselves into mediation, and settle the case quickly.  Ms. P did not 
have to face the judge as a defendant and did not have to dispose of the used 
garage door herself.  Mr. Q received his payment plus interest plus the 
original door.  Mediator M provided the parties with information about 
mediation at the outset and then gave each of them time in caucus and in 
joint session.  Both parties were satisfied with the result.  From the 
perspective of court resources, the process was efficient; from the 
perspective of the parties, the process was voluntary and the agreement 
consensual.15   
Or—maybe a terrible small claims mediation.  Perhaps the fact that P 
was an older woman unfamiliar with small claims court and mediation and 
Q sounds like a rascal and a repeat player suggests that disparities in gender, 
age, and process familiarity may have affected the outcome.16  Or perhaps 
 
 15. See Donna Shestowsky, Disputants’ Preferences for Court-Connected Dispute Resolution 
Procedures: Why We Should Care and Why We Know So Little, 23 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 549, 
556 (2008) (explaining that court-connected ADR has dual purposes of efficiency and self-
determination); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Introduction: What Will We Do when Adjudication Ends? 
A Brief Intellectual History of ADR, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1613, 1616 (1997) [hereinafter Intellectual 
History] (noting ADR’s potential both for efficiency and for “tailor-made solutions” supporting 
justice). 
 16. Many critics have argued that the apparent informality of alternative processes can actually 
replicate existing power disparities and even extend state oversight into previously private affairs.  
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the apparent facilitative-to-evaluative shift by M in caucus speaks to 
inappropriate pressure to settle and potential coercion.17  Or maybe the 
agreement—which essentially allows Q to recover twice for the door, less 
loading and transport, and never addresses the inconvenience or costs 
associated with the original faulty installation—is so lopsided as to be 
unfair.  Would things have gone differently if Ms. P had not been alone on 
the day of the hearing?18  If more materials about mediation had been 
available?  If a judge had decided the outcome?  If M had been facilitative 
throughout, or even a different M altogether?  If Q had offered (or M or P 
had thought to ask about) the value of the door and the cost of loading and 
transporting it before the parties signed the agreement? 
Here we have a puzzle.  On the one hand, this story is a familiar dispute 
resolution narrative of consent, choice, and self-determination.  On the other 
hand, this story is about luck—of this M instead of that M, of this court’s 
particular approach to making mediation available, of Ms. P’s failure to 
think of the right questions at the right time, of the variability and chance 
that shape human interactions even in the most institutionalized and 
 
See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545 
(1991); Richard Delgado et al., supra note 10; Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: 
Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1359 (1985); 
Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984).  Even those who are not part of 
vulnerable or marginalized populations may experience “social anxiety” in mediated settings that is 
detrimental to self-determination and participation. Robert M. Ackerman, Disputing Together: 
Conflict Resolution and the Search for Community, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 27, 74-75 
(2002). 
 17. See John W. Cooley & Lela P. Love, Midstream Mediator Evaluations and Informed 
Consent, 14 NO. 2 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 11 (2008) (advising mediators against shifting from 
facilitative to evaluative without informed and preferably written consent from the parties); James R. 
Coben, Mediation’s Dirty Little Secret: Straight Talk About Mediator Manipulation and Deception, 
2 J. ALT. DISP. RESOL. EMP’T 4, 4 (2000) [hereinafter Dirty Little Secret] (stating that “mediation’s 
dirty little secret is the degree to which mediators themselves routinely and unabashedly engage in 
manipulation and deception to foster settlements”). 
 18. Unrepresented disputants are, empirically speaking, at a disadvantage in court-connected 
mediation settings.  See, e.g., Carroll Seron et al., The Impact of Legal Counsel on Outcomes for 
Poor Tenants in New York City’s Housing Court: Results of a Randomized Experiment, 35 LAW & 
SOC’Y REV. 419 (2001).  Also problematic is the situation in which one party has a lawyer and the 
other does not.  See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter & David Bloom, Lawyers as Agents of the Devil in a 
Prisoner’s Dilemma Game 16-21 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 4447, 1993) 
(demonstrating that the side with the lawyer will get better results than the side without a lawyer).  
But see Roselle L. Wissler, Representation in Mediation: What We Know from Empirical Research, 
37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 419 (2010) (suggesting that empirical research shows that unrepresented 
parties do not see the mediation process as less fair, the mediator as less impartial, the pressure to 
settle as greater, or the settlement as less fair than do represented parties). 
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intentional contexts.  What’s puzzling is that we normally do not think of 
consent and luck as compatible.  In fact, the law generally and procedural 
dispute resolution specifically work to eliminate unpredictability and 
arbitrariness;19 this is perhaps especially true for non-binding consent-based 
processes, such as the small claims mediation described above, which allow 
parties to walk away from unacceptable process developments or unjust 
proposals.  Further complicating matters is the fact that ADR embraces 
customization and differences within dispute resolution—not randomness, 
but multiple approaches and outcomes based on the interests, values, and 
resources of the actual disputants involved.20  This means that similar 
disputes may have dissimilar resolutions, as a matter of ADR philosophy 
and practice.  But how to distinguish these arguably welcome variations 
from those based on bad luck? 
The problem exists beyond the garage door hypothetical.  Consent 
litigation (the result of one party refusing to comply with the terms of a 
mediated agreement, even though that same party consented to those terms 
in mediation) is on the rise.21  Consent litigation cases suggest that consent 
in the moment may not be a reliable indicator of autonomy, agency, and self-
determination—all foundational to mediation as a legitimate process 
alternative to traditional forms of adjudication.  Indeed, along with the 
increasing institutionalization of alternative processes, scholars and 
practitioners have become increasingly concerned about the cracks forming 
between alternative theory and practice.  For example, scholars have argued 
that mediator coercion and mandatory mediation/arbitration schemes have 
eroded the capacity of ADR processes to support true consent and self-
determination.22  As a matter of legal consciousness and social justice, it is 
 
 19. See, e.g., JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES AND MATERIALS 2 
(10th ed. 2009) (stating that dispute resolution “proceeds not arbitrarily but according to some 
standards of general procedure”). 
 20. See, e.g., Michael Moffitt, Contingent Agreements: Agreeing To Disagree About the 
Future, 87 MARQ. L. REV. 691 (2004) (explaining how different forecasts can provide value-creating 
opportunities in deals); ROBERT H. MNOOKIN ET AL., BEYOND WINNING: NEGOTIATING TO CREATE 
VALUE IN DEALS AND DISPUTES (2d ed. 2000) (describing basic integrative theory and the potential 
for party differences to be sources of value). 
 21. See Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Mediation Exceptionality, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1247 (2009) 
(arguing that the blending of consensual and nonconsensual features in mediation has led to an 
increase in consent litigation cases). 
 22. See, e.g., Margaret B. Drew, Collaboration and Coercion, 24 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L.J. 79 
(2013) (arguing that collaborative practitioners must consider their role in exacerbating clients’ 
trauma when dealing with abusive relationships); Jim Coben & Lela Love, Trick or Treat? The 
Ethics of Mediator Manipulation, 17 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 17 (2010); Timothy Hedeen, 
Coercion and Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: All Mediations Are Voluntary, But 
Some Are More Voluntary Than Others, 26 JUST. SYS. J. 273 (2005) (making recommendations to 
minimize coercion in court-connected mediation); Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining 
8
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wrong to promulgate alternative processes if those processes disempower 
disputants and provide them with objectively worse results than they likely 
would have gotten had they gone the non-alternative route.23 
This is bad enough, but it gets worse as we scale upward into multiparty 
contexts such as collaborative public-private decision-making.24  Large-scale 
cases introduce problems not just with individual consent, as those in the 
consent litigation cases, but also with an individual’s consent in her capacity 
as a member of the public.25 In his analysis of collaborative management of 
the Glen Canyon Dam, for example, Joseph Feller argues that focusing on 
stakeholder interests does not promote wise decision-making around public 
lands because stakeholder interests do not usually contemplate the broader 
“public interest.”26  For stakeholders in such cases, it is not necessarily easy 
to appreciate the impact that one’s consent will have on public life.  Without 
this appreciation, a consent-based stakeholder-focused process may look 
satisfactory (e.g., everyone agrees) but is nonetheless inadequate given the 
ripple effects of decision-making in such contexts. 
The garage door mediation, then, is an easy entry point into these 
difficult policy and design considerations.  At all levels of alternative 
processes, the emphasis on party consent must be reevaluated in light of the 
 
Power, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 140 (2005) (arguing that current standards regarding the legal 
consequences to attach to bargaining power are insufficient to deal with disparities); James J. Alfini 
& Catherine G. McCabe, Mediating in the Shadow of the Courts: A Survey of the Emerging Case 
Law, 54 ARK. L. REV. 171 (2001) (arguing that the general policy, in court-connected mediation, of 
favoring settlement, raises troubling issues of settlement coercions, and departs from mediation’s 
core principles and values); Scott Altman, Lurking in the Shadow, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 493 (1995) 
(illuminating the complexities involved in “trades” that occur in divorce settlement negotiations; 
focusing specifically on the coercion and exploitation that “lurks” behind these trades). 
 23. Larry Susskind has famously argued that mediation success is not solely a function of 
sound process and party satisfaction but also of the objective fairness of the outcome.  Lawrence 
Susskind, Environmental Mediation and the Accountability Problem, 6 VT. L. REV. 1, 14 (1981). 
 24. And perhaps even worse when we consider the growing phenomenon of state and 
corporate exportation and encouragement of ADR practices overseas.  See, e.g., Eduardo R.C. 
Capulong, Mediation and the Neocolonial Legal Order: Access to Justice and Self-Determination in 
the Philippines, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 641, 643 (2012) (arguing for “counter-hegemonic 
community mediation practice in the neocolonial setting” that is responsive to local values and 
norms). 
 25. See Susskind, supra note 23, at 8 (describing the problem of justice vis-à-vis  
unrepresented third parties, such as future generations, in mediation). 
 26. Joseph M. Feller, Collaborative Management of Glen Canyon Dam: The Elevation of 
Social Engineering over Law, 8 NEV. L.J. 896, 898 (2008) (criticizing collaborative management for 
elevating consensus among stakeholders over legal rules and policy objectives); see also Susskind, 
supra note 23. 
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variability, chance, and contingency that attend human affairs.  Managing 
contingencies in various ADR settings, from private mediation to large-scale 
complex public deliberations, requires first an analytical framework for 
understanding how luck operates in these settings.  The garage door 
mediation is a good test subject for developing this framework. 
To that end, what follows is a general definition of luck followed by 
discussions of moral luck, legal luck, and the special case of “ADR luck.” 
A. What Is Luck? 
Agents make choices.  What happens as a result of those choices – 
indeed, what led the agent to make those choices in the first place – are not 
wholly within the control of the agent herself.  External to the agent’s 
conscious decision-making are “unchosen inputs” that may be truly random 
(being struck by lightning) or may be due to the “unconsented-to” choices 
and actions of others.27  These unchosen inputs may manifest as bad luck 
(being born into poverty) or good luck (winning the lottery), and often 
comprise an overdetermined mix of stochastic and other-driven events that 
cannot be easily disaggregated from each other or from the agent’s own 
intentional choices.28 
Just to complicate matters a little further, classifying an event as “bad 
luck” or “good luck” is often a matter of interpretation, specific to 
circumstances and personalities of those involved.29  Many lottery players, 
for example, believe ex ante that winning the lottery is enormous good 
luck—yet, ex post, many lottery winners report the same or even lower 
happiness levels after the big win.30  Such results suggest that whether a 
lucky event seems good or bad depends in part on when the evaluation 
happens.  Similarly, whether a person describes being born into poverty as 
good or bad luck is, arguably, itself a choice in building one’s self-narrative 
 
 27. See Lee Anne Fennell, Odds and Ends: An Epstein-Inspired Look at Luck, 44 TULSA L. 
REV. 779, 781-82 (2009).  Fennell refers to Ronald Dworkin’s well-known distinction between 
“brute luck” (arising from factors wholly outside of one’s control) and “option luck” (arising from 
choices that bear risks).  Id. at 782 (citing Ronald Dworkin, What Is Equality? Part 2: Equality of 
Resources, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 283, 293 (1981)). 
 28. Fennell, supra note 27, at 790 (explaining why disaggregation of luck from choice is often 
too costly to pursue in legal rules and policy). 
 29. See THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QUESTIONS 28, 33-34 (1979) (describing constitutive luck, 
which defines who a person is, and circumstantial luck, which defines what kinds of events a person 
must deal with). 
 30. See Rick Swedloff & Peter H. Huang, Tort Damages and the New Science of Happiness, 
85 IND. L.J. 553, 555 (2010); Cass R. Sunstein, Illusory Losses, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. S157, S166 
(2008).  Studies also show that assistant professors denied tenure have the same level of happiness, a 
few years later, as those not denied tenure.  Id. 
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that may serve as an explanation or support for other choices, positive or 
negative. (And of course, how one chooses to build one’s self-narrative 
could in turn be a product of unchosen inputs, such as the role models one 
happened to have.)31  What’s more, the difference between events that are 
truly out of one’s control versus those that are the attenuated consequences 
of some earlier choice is not self-evident.32  Sorting through the unasked-for 
and the chosen becomes, following this train, an endless task that implicates, 
among other concerns, the well-known intractable tension between free will 
and determinism. 
These are the beginnings of murky waters, so here we adopt Lee Anne  
Fennell’s excellent definition: “luck is not a label that permanently adheres 
to particular events, but rather a measure of the extent to which a given event 
was out of the control of the person under consideration.”33  This definition 
aptly captures the variability of subjective interpretations (luck or choice? 
good luck or bad luck?) while emphasizing the agency and control issues 
that are foundational to luck-based analyses. 
1. Moral Luck 
Yet to appreciate the problem that luck poses for legal thinkers, a quick 
dip into the murky waters is in order. Luck’s relationship to morality 
presents a classic Western moral philosophical conundrum.34 
Whether a reckless driver who accidentally kills a pedestrian is morally 
worse than an equally reckless driver who happens not to kill anyone 
implicates, within the moral philosophical tradition, searching questions as 
to the exercise of moral judgment on the part of agentic beings. 
On one side, we have Kant, who would adjudge these people the same.  
The Kantian view that morality is separate from and indeed immune to luck 
and therefore unaffected by results has been widely influential in Western 
 
 31. This would be an example of circumstantial luck.  NAGEL, supra note 29, at 28. 
 32. In an open and ongoing system, contingencies make impossible the exercise of choice 
unaffected in some way and at some point by unchosen events.  On this view, Dworkin’s option luck 
seems inevitably to yield to brute luck. As Nagel writes, “The area of genuine agency, and therefore 
of legitimate moral judgment, seems to shrink under this scrutiny to an extensionless point.”  Id. at 
35. 
 33. Fennell, supra note 27, at 782 (quotation marks omitted).  See also Menachem Mautner, 
Luck in the Courts, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 217, 217 (2008) (defining lucky situations as those 
featuring both lack of control and multiple possible outcomes). 
 34. See Statman, supra note 2. 
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thought and jurisprudence; it accords with the appealing liberal idea that 
everyone – despite accidents of birth or circumstances – has the capacity to 
behave in a perfectly moral fashion. The categorical imperative (“I ought 
never to act in such a way that I could not also will that my maxim should 
become a universal law”35) assumes that moral truths are absolute, 
unchanging, and universal.  Contingencies and context are not part of Kant’s 
moral calculus, and so luck simply does not figure into Kant’s moral 
philosophy.  An individual’s morality on this view exists and endures 
separately from inputs and outcomes: 
Even if it were to happen that, because of some particularly unfortunate fate or the 
miserly bequest of a stepmotherly nature, this will were completely powerless to carry 
out its aims; if with even its utmost effort it still accomplished nothing, so that only good 
will itself remained (not, of course, as a mere wish, but as the summoning of every means 
in our power), even then it would still, like a jewel, glisten in its own right, as something 
that has its full worth in itself. Its utility or ineffectuality can neither add to nor subtract 
from this worth.36 
For Kant, therefore, the fact that the first driver killed someone does not 
make him morally worse than the other driver; likewise, that the second 
driver did not kill anyone does not make him morally better than the first. 
On the other side, we have the moral luck philosophers, starting with 
Bernard Williams and Thomas Nagel.  In 1979, Williams argued that 
outcomes affect a person’s own accurate self-assessment of his moral worth 
and thus moral theory is personal, not universal.37  On this view, the reckless 
driver who kills the pedestrian is morally worse than the one who does not 
kill anyone, even if both drivers were equally reckless (in fact, even if the 
second driver was considerably more reckless).  Observing that we would all 
expect that the first driver will feel terrible about what happened (what 
Williams called “agent-regret”38), Williams suggested that morality is not an 
absolute universal construct but a local one, a function of one’s own 
“rational justification of his own actions to himself”39 and situated as an 
after-the-fact judgment.40 
 
 35. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 203 (Thomas E. 
Hill, Jr. & Arnulf Zweig eds., Arnulf Zweig trans., Oxford Univ. Press 2002) (1785). 
 36. Id. at 196. 
 37. See Bernard Williams, Moral Luck, in MORAL LUCK 36 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993) 
(distinguishing his more subjective, retrospective approach from Kant’s universal, unconditioned 
idea of moral value). 
 38. Id. at 42. 
 39. Bagchi, supra note 9, at 1885. 
 40. Williams uses the example of an artist who chooses to abandon his family and pursue his 
art in Tahiti.  Whether this decision is morally defensible will depend, Williams argues, on whether 
the artist actually fulfills his potential, which he cannot know in advance.  Because morality on this 
12
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Although Thomas Nagel did not go as far as Williams in rejecting 
Kantian morality outright, he too pointed out that morally significant 
qualitative differences can arise from events outside the agent’s control: 
“We judge people for what they actually do or fail to do, not just for what 
they would have done if circumstances had been different.”41  Not to take 
luck effects into account, he argues, turns a blind eye to the multiple forces 
and factors that ultimately constitute what we like to think of as agency: 
I believe in a sense that the problem has no solution, because something in the idea of 
agency is incompatible with actions being events, or people being things. But as the 
external determinants of what someone has done are gradually exposed, in their effect on 
consequences, character, and choice itself, it becomes gradually clear that actions are 
events and people things.  Eventually nothing remains which can be ascribed to the 
responsible self, and we are left with nothing but a portion of the larger sequence of 
events, which can be deplored or celebrated, but not blamed or praised.42 
These discussions can get pretty heady pretty fast.  Was Rousseau 
morally justified in sending his children off to the orphanage so that he could 
concentrate on his philosophy?  What is the moral difference between an 
actual Nazi and a German who moved to a farm in Argentina in the 1930s 
and lived a quiet life but who would have, had he stayed in Germany, 
become a Nazi too?43  To be sure, workaday lawyers and law professors 
rarely indulge these kinds of provocative thought experiments, instead 
focusing on engineering solutions to client- and policy-driven problems.  Yet 
the moral luck dynamic persists in our sociopolitical discourse, not often 
explicitly but as a felt complication in modern debates around religious 
fundamentalism, nature versus nurture, moral relativism, and personal 
responsibility. 
 
view depends on outcomes, and because outcomes are affected by circumstances and actors outside 
one’s control, luck ends up figuring prominently in whether the decision is moral or not.  Williams, 
supra note 37, at 37-41.  The reader might object that outcomes might not affect the objective 
(outside) moral evaluation of a given decision and that the artist was morally wrong to leave his 
family regardless of success.  Here is a different example that might demonstrate Williams’s point 
more clearly: the moral assessment of a decision to leave a baby in a bathtub momentarily with the 
water running, for example, will change depending on the outcome.  NAGEL, supra note 29, at 30-
31.  Insisting that the moral value of leaving the baby in the bathtub is the same regardless of 
outcome is, on this view, not only unconvincing but unhelpfully reductive when thinking through 
human moral complexities. 
 41. NAGEL, supra note 29, at 34. 
 42. Id. at 39. 
 43. Id. at 26, 34. 
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3. Legal Luck 
Related to moral luck is legal luck, which explores the impact of fortuity 
on legal rules and outcomes.  Like moral luck, legal luck presents situations 
in which outcomes play a large role in determining how legally wrong an 
action is.  If A shoots at B with the intent to kill, and indeed does kill B, then 
A is guilty of murder. If X shoots at Y with the intent to kill, but a bird flies 
in between them and takes the bullet and Y lives, then X is guilty of 
attempted murder—a crime that carries different penalties than murder, even 
though the intentions and actions in both cases were the same.44  As Jeremy 
Waldron notes, luck effects are “ineliminable” in the positive law, because 
positive law is characterized by line drawing, definitionally and 
temporally.45 Similar luck disparities result when legislatures pass new laws; 
what might have been legal yesterday is illegal today, and it is only the 
present offender’s bad luck that he did not offend one day sooner.46 
Additionally, luck emerges in legal settings because people (judges and 
juries)—not written laws—decide cases.  Neither Dworkin’s conception of 
judicial integrity nor a return to “natural law” would ameliorate luck effects.  
As Waldron points out, both judges acting with integrity and natural law 
introduce chance into the proceedings, because there is no way to come to 
consensus about what integrity or natural law requires.47  Both are 
necessarily subjective in practice, given that no external measure or (divine) 
intervention is available.  Such adjudication would be subject to differing 
interpretations by different people or even by the same person over time.  
These differences would introduce luck into legal proceedings, likely much 
more luck and uncertainty than exist in the positive law.48  As appealing as 
judicial integrity or natural law might seem in curing luck effects in law, 
therefore, even a fully realized implementation of such regimes would not 
rid the law of luck. 
Because a luck-free legal system is not an option, legal luck analyses 
often concern themselves with the appropriate allocation of responsibilities 
in the aftermath of lucky events. If a cosmic ray hits a bank computer and 
 
 44. Nagel uses the example of the bird flying in front of the bullet.  NAGEL, supra note 29, at 
31. 
 45. Jeremy Waldron, Lucky in Your Judge, 9 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 185, 187, 193 
(2008). 
 46. Id. at 193. 
 47. Id. at 197, 209-14. 
 48. Id. at 201 (“We want to be ruled by settled rules, not by natural law reasoning about 
particular cases, because we figure the element of luck and arbitrariness and unpredictability 
involved in the latter far exceeds the element of luck and arbitrariness and unpredictability involved 
in the former.  That is Locke’s argument, and it seems to me quite persuasive.”). 
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scrambles some of the accounts, for example, should we pay whatever it 
takes to fix it (and thus support expectations around property) or should we 
insist that the affected account holders seek help from decentralized sources, 
such as private charities or family?49  Certainly private insurance can help 
manage certain luck effects ahead of time, but not for every contingency 
(such as the cosmic ray) or for every potentially affected person.  For those 
studying legal luck, these fortuitous situations present as system-level 
glitches that require an assessment of whether institutional “buffers” (legal 
rules allocating responsibility, insurance regimes, etc.) are possible and, if 
so, affordable as a matter of policy and costs.  If such buffers are not 
available for whatever reason, then the discussion turns to what the impacts 
of unbuffered luck on ordered society might be. 
None of this comes as a surprise to those who study the law, especially 
those who study civil procedure.  As proceduralists and practitioners know, 
lawyers become experts at scoping out judges, analyzing jury pools, 
shopping for forums, and thinking through novel theories and extensions of 
existing that just might work in this particular fact pattern.50  Within the 
legal academy, the realist, critical, and post-critical movements have 
identified myriad external influences on legal rules and outcomes, such 
ideological politics, judicial personalities, power structures, coalitions and 
alliances, and agency capture.51  Learning to think like a lawyer means, for 
many people, becoming less idealistic about the capability of human-made 
systems to deliver justice. 
Yet the widespread recognition of luck effects in the law does not 
equate to widespread acceptance of those effects, which is why scholars see 
luck as problematic, as a matter of both theory and practice.  This is because 
the core values of the legal system still resonate—with legal actors, surely, 
but perhaps especially with non-lawyers.  These values, which include 
predictability, non-arbitrariness, and fairness, reinforce the prevailing belief 
that  “law should not be random in its application to its subjects, and that 
those who contend with it should not have to hope for luck, or fear bad luck, 
 
 49. Professor Fennell cites this example from Epstein’s 1988 essay on luck.  Fennell, supra 
note 27, at 779 (citing Richard A. Epstein, Luck, 6 SOC. PHIL. & POLICY 17, 30 (1988)). 
 50. See, e.g., Markus Petsche, What’s Wrong with Forum Shopping? An Attempt To Identify 
and Assess the Real Issues of a Controversial Practice, 45 INT’L LAW. 1005 (2011). 
 51. See, e.g., Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law Survive Judicial Politics?, 97 
CORNELL L. REV. 191 (2012); Kimberle Williams, Twenty Years of Critical Race Theory: Looking 
Back To Move Forward, 43 CONN. L. REV. 1253 (2011); Steve Bachmann, Lawyers, Law, and 
Social Change—Update Year 2010, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 499 (2010). 
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in the law that is applied to their case.”52  Predictability assures members of 
society that they can go ahead and make plans and investments in the 
context of established rules and reliable regulation.  Non-arbitrariness 
prevents parties from suffering undeserved “financial loss, incarceration, 
stigmatization, and non-vindication in a dispute”53 at the hands of the public 
justice system.  Fairness means, in the most basic sense, that like cases will 
be treated alike.54  Although these three values can never be fully realized in 
a contingent, plural, political environment, they retain strong cultural 
resonance and are certainly worthy aspirations for those engaged in the 
various enterprises of the law. 
Legal luck, then, is one entry point for considering how our legal 
institutions exist within a particular historical/ideological set of contexts 
which both determine and misdirect institutional strategies for delivering 
justice.  Legal luck reminds us that human-made systems have shifting and 
unavoidable gaps and uneven places that trip up the unlucky.55  With that 
frame, legal scholars and policymakers are able to think through the policy 
implications, the resource expense, and the system design difficulties 
associated with attempting to calibrate that system a little more perfectly.56 
3. “ADR Luck” 
Legal luck philosophers have focused most of their scholarly energies 
on good and bad luck in tort and criminal law.57  Aditi Bagchi recently 
expanded the conversation to contract law, considering the impacts that 
background institutions, contract rules, and private negotiation have on 
“manag[ing] moral risk” in contract.58  Aside from Bagchi’s excellent 
analysis, which includes discussion of consent in non-dispute settings (such 
 
 52. Waldron, supra note 45, at 192. 
 53. Waldron, supra note 45, at 191; see also Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 
YALE L.J. 1601 (1986) (describing the power of civil legal regimes and judges to harm one’s person 
and property). 
 54. See Waldron, supra note 45, at 191-92. 
 55. Marc Galanter provides a memorable image of litigation as a billiards table with many 
games happening at once.  “What would an observer perched above the table see?  Balls colliding, 
deflected; energies dissipated and transmitted.  The course of the balls is not random. … Yet the 
overall pattern is not traceable to or deducible from the goals or strategies of any of the players.  For 
each is surrounded by unknowable contingencies, including in part the cumulative effects of the 
actions of the others.”  Marc Galanter, Case Congregations and Their Careers, 24 LAW & SOC’Y 
REV. 371, 395 (1990). 
 56. Fennell, supra note 27, at 789-96 (analyzing the economic impact of over-responsible and 
under-responsible luck-managing mechanisms in the law). 
 57. See sources cited supra note 14. 
 58. Bagchi, supra note 9. 
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as private negotiation), the relationship between legal luck and ADR 
processes—namely, mediation, arbitration, and negotiation—has not 
received any attention in luck or ADR scholarship.59 
This section examines whether “ADR luck” is a meaningful subset of 
legal luck and, if so, what its attributes and operational characteristics might 
be.  Because ADR is such a vast area of theory and practice, we will limit 
the present discussion to court-connected ADR processes, and accordingly 
some brief context is in order. 
It is no longer possible to talk about procedural law without considering 
the impact of ADR on pre-trial and other court-connected processes.  At 
least since Frank Sander presented his vision of the multi-door courthouse in 
1976, state and federal courts have developed an array of non-litigation 
avenues for those seeking redress in the public courts.60  Court-connected 
ADR processes, such as mandatory mediation or non-binding arbitration, are 
supposed to help with docket management and provide quicker resolutions 
to participants.61  Litigants in small claims court, for example, often find 
themselves (intentionally or otherwise) in pre-hearing mediations, so that the 
parties have a chance to air their grievances and work out their usually 
straightforward concerns, neither of which necessarily require judicial 
expertise or involvement.62 
 
 59. Bagchi’s position accords with my own.  She disagrees with the prevailing view that 
“there can be nothing morally wrong with the terms on which one contracts because those terms are 
consented to by the other party” and argues instead “that it is possible (though rare) to wrong another 
individual through a voluntary transaction.”  Id. at 1895.  Her essay then examines the implications 
of this argument for notions of legal and moral responsibility. 
 60. See THE POUND CONFERENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE (A. Leo Levin 
& Russell Wheeler eds., 1979); see also Judith Resnik, Many Doors? Closing Doors? Alternative 
Dispute Resolution and Adjudication, 10 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 211 (1995); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Pursuing Settlement in an Adversary Culture: A Tale of Innovation Co-opted or “The Law 
of ADR,” 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 61. But as Professor Shestowsky points out, the efficiency benefits of court-connected 
processes are often overstated.  “Courts often subordinate disputants’ needs to the desires of the 
bench (as well as the bar) to clear dockets and reduce the institutional costs of disputes even though 
empirical studies of court-connected programs suggest that they often fail to meet these institutional 
goals.”  Shestowsky, supra note 15, at 551.  My own analysis of judicial writings about mediation 
suggest that judges indeed support and believe in the efficiency benefits of court-connected 
mediation.  See Jennifer W. Reynolds, What Judges Write when They Write About Mediation, 5 
PENN ST. Y.B. ON ARB. & MED. 111 (2013). 
 62. See Nolan-Haley, supra note 21, at 1253-54 (describing the seeming contradiction 
between a “central ideology” of voluntary participation and the willingness of legislatures to 
mandate mediation in certain cases). 
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Efficiency is not the only reason that alternative processes have emerged 
in legal settings, however.  Early community mediation proponents and 
access to justice activists stressed the potential justice benefits that less 
adversarial, less institutional, more informal, more local interventions may 
provide.63  The development of “interest-based” ADR techniques promised 
to help disputants resolve not only the legal aspects of their dispute but also 
other extra-legal concerns, such as ongoing relationship and communication 
challenges.64  Many working in the area of family law, for example, have 
long championed the benefits of non-litigation ADR processes in cases of 
divorce, custody, and other family-related disputes in which providing for 
the well-being of the individuals involved as well as for the strength of the 
family ties is as important as resolving the legal matters at stake.65  Simply 
put, empowering disputants to craft their own solutions – making possible 
“tailor-made justice”66 – has been and is still a central tenet of ADR 
philosophy and practice, along with and often in tension with ADR’s 
promises of efficiency.67 
In this way, as I have argued similarly elsewhere, ADR may be thought 
of as an Epsteinian decentralized institutional response to luck effects in the 
law.68  Early ADR proponents saw alternative practice as a way to eliminate 
the arbitrariness of law in dispute resolution.69  Part of the popular 
 
 63. See, e.g., Karen G. Duffy & James Thomson, Community Mediation Centers: Humanistic 
Alternatives to the Court System, A Pilot Study, 32 No. 2 J. OF HUMANISTIC PSYCHOL. 101 (1992) 
(evaluating mediation as a “humanistic dispute resolution process” that better addresses disputants’ 
Maslowian needs than do adversarial systems); see also Amy J. Cohen & Michal Alberstein, 
Progressive Constitutionalism and Alternative Movements in Law, 72 OHIO ST. L.J. 1083, 1091-92 
(2011) (describing the early ADR movement as driven in part by a desire to “transform ordinary 
people from passive subjects into empowered ones” who did not need help from legal institutions). 
 64. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT 
WITHOUT GIVING IN 3-14 (1981) (stressing the importance of identifying and addressing the 
interests underlying positions). 
 65. See generally CARRIE MENKEL-MEADOW ET AL., DISPUTE RESOLUTION: BEYOND THE 
ADVERSARIAL MODEL 274 (2005) (identifying family disputes as one of the mediation’s “major 
growth areas” due to the harmful impacts from adversarial process on ongoing family relationships); 
but see John Zeleznikow & Andrew Vincent, Providing Decision Support for Negotiation: The Need 
for Adding Notions of Fairness to Those of Interests, 38 U. TOL. L. REV. 1199,1233 (2007) (“Family 
law is one domain where interest-based notions of mediation conflict with notions of justice”). 
 66. See Intellectual History, supra note 15. 
 67. See Shestowsky, supra note 15; see also ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, 
THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994) (asserting that narrow focus on settlement does not promote 
larger justice and relationship concerns that mediation has potential to address). 
 68. See Jennifer W. Reynolds, Games, Dystopia, and ADR, 27 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 
477, 480-81 (2012) (arguing that the “utopian promise” of ADR responds to perceived dystopian 
features of traditional law, such as arbitrary or coercive process). 
 69. Eliminating arbitrariness was not, in the those days, merely a matter of creating better 
process.  In an early examination of the community mediation movement, for example, Christine 
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dissatisfaction with the law that led to the modern ADR movement, after all, 
were system distortions (delay, overcrowding, contentiousness) that created 
too much variability and concomitant gamesmanship in what should be 
orderly legal proceedings.70  In contrast, ADR promised a highly 
individuated alternative designed to promote civility, respect difference, and 
seek resolution (broadly defined as integrative agreements that encompass 
relational concerns) through dialogue.71  These utopian goals were made 
possible through the valorization of self-determination and autonomy: 
choice, not chance, shapes the parties’ process and outcomes.72  As such, and 
using the theoretical constructs of legal luck, ADR arguably provided a less 
chancy proposition than the crowded, clunky legal system for parties 
attempting to resolve disputes. 
Even so, because ADR is so closely linked to legal process and 
substantive law, ADR is arguably subject to the same luck effects as the law 
itself.  As Mnookin and Kornhauser famously observed, the positive law 
creates a “shadow” on private negotiation and mediation, and as such parties 
engaged in those alternative processes have bargaining entitlements and 
concessions derived from perceived legal rights.73  To the extent that the law 
 
Harrington and Sally Merry argued that by 1988, the original three goals of the movement—
”delivery of dispute resolution services,” “social transformation,” and “personal growth and 
development”—were overwhelmed by an ideology of “consensus process” that “submerge[d] the 
ideology of community justice.”  Christine B. Harrington & Sally Engle Merry, Ideological 
Production: The Making of Community Mediation, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 709, 714-15, 729 (1988).  
Elevating process over participants’ needs is one of the problems of institutionalized ADR and may 
alienate participants.  See Just Resolutions, supra note 6 (noting that overemphasis on resolution 
may lead to ADR processes that do not promote disputants’ self-determination or participation). 
 70. See, e.g., Warren E. Burger, Remarks of Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice of the United 
States at the Dedication of Notre Dame London Law Centre: The Role of the Lawyer Today, 59 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 4 (1983) (emphasizing the need for lawyers “who understand that access to 
justice does not invariably mean access to courtrooms”). 
 71. See, e.g., Andrea Kupfer Schneider, The Intersection of Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 
Preventive Law, and Alternative Dispute Resolution, 5 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 1084 (1999) 
(situating ADR as a legal reform); see also Frank E. A. Sander & Stephen B. Goldberg, Fitting the 
Forum to the Fuss: A User-Friendly Guide To Selecting an ADR Procedure, 10 NEG. J. 49 (1994). 
 72. Emphasis on self-determination emerges in different ways in the three big areas of ADR 
(negotiation, mediation, and arbitration).  Private interest-based negotiation, for example, 
emphasizes the creative possibilities inherent in sharing information and recognizing the importance 
of ongoing relationships.  Mediation focuses on party choice and mediators will tell the parties, often 
more than once, that they can leave at any time.  Arbitration, for its part, is cloaked in the mythology 
of equally powerful merchants who would prefer a subject-matter expert to resolve their dispute 
without a lot of process baggage—thus supporting their self-determination and autonomous ends. 
 73. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case 
of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 950 (1979). 
19
Reynolds: Luck v. Justice: Consent Intervenes, but for Whom?
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2014
 264 
does or does not offer a particular remedy or right, therefore, bargaining 
positions are adjusted accordingly.  For example, if a would-be plaintiff 
cannot pursue her case in court because the relevant statute of limitations has 
passed, it is unlikely that she will be successful in private mediation.  In this 
way, ADR is tethered to the contingencies of positive law and therefore is 
subject to the same legal luck. 
So modern ADR is both a response to legal luck and subject to legal 
luck.  Over the years, the primary focus of the alternative movement has 
settled on efficient disposition of disputes, upstream and down, and not as 
much on the movement’s original commitments to social transformation and 
individual empowerment.74  Accordingly, court-connected mediation often 
narrows the dispute along legal lines, dampening mediation’s effectiveness 
as a legal luck buffer and making mediation more susceptible to luck effects 
associated with the positive law.75 
Additionally, the fact that alternative processes are often flexible, 
confidential, and relatively unencumbered by professional norms on the part 
of institutional players (mediators, arbitrators, lawyers) may lead to 
significant luckiness and disparity in outcomes, even for cases that are 
themselves alike.  Consider the example of lawyers appearing in mediation 
settings. Some lawyers may seek to promote integrative outcomes and 
information sharing, in accordance with mediation philosophy.76  Others, in 
contrast, may assume an adversarial stance and use the mediation to 
intimidate the opponent or to avoid litigation costs (e.g., the problem of “free 
discovery” in mediation).77  Because mediation in particular does not have 
 
 74. See Harrington & Merry, supra note 69; see also Cohen & Alberstein, supra  note 63. 
 75. See, e.g., Leonard L. Riskin & Nancy A. Welsh, Is That All There Is? “The Problem” in 
Court-Oriented Mediation, 15 GEO. MASON L. REV. 863, 864 (2008) (arguing from empirical 
evidence that court-connected mediation tends to focus on narrow legal issues, not on broader 
extralegal concerns). 
 76. See, e.g., Michael T. Colatrella Jr., A “Lawyer for All Seasons”: The Lawyer as Conflict 
Manager, 49 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 93 (2012) (arguing that lawyers who adopt a broad conflict 
management approach will cut costs, save time, and better preserve relationships among disputants); 
Kimberlee K. Kovach, New Wine Requires New Wineskins: Transforming Lawyer Ethics for 
Effective Representation in a Non-Adversarial Approach to Problem Solving: Mediation, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 935 (2001) (raising questions about how to assure that lawyers will learn to 
become effective mediation advocates); Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow, When Winning Isn’t Everything: 
The Lawyer as Problem Solver, 28 HOFSTRA L. REV. 905 (2000) (describing new professional 
paradigm for lawyers emphasizing problem-solving over adversarialism); John Lande, How Will 
Lawyering and Mediation Practices Transform Each Other?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 839 (1997) 
(recommending that lawyers become familiar with the various styles of mediation practice so that 
they can competently advise clients about use of mediation, select mediators appropriate for 
particular cases, and constructively participate in mediation as appropriate). 
 77. See, e.g., Thomas J. Stipanowich, Beyond Arbitration: Innovation and Evolution in the 
United States Construction Industry, 31 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 65, 102 (reporting that survey 
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fixed process or procedural safeguards, other than confidentiality, lawyers 
may behave differently than they would in a more controlled, public 
litigation setting.78  Certainly clients can choose their own lawyer 
intentionally, but whether the other lawyer will be cooperative or combative 
is, often, a matter of luck.79  To the extent that alternative processes are 
concerned with non-litigation and extra-legal priorities—and to the extent 
that those processes do not include the same rules or restraints of traditional 
legal settings that impose formal controls over attorney behavior—the 
presence of lawyers exposes ADR participants to some measure of 
additional chance and uncertainty than might otherwise exist.80 
 
respondents feared that “revelations in mediation may ‘unfairly’ serve as a source of discovery”); see 
also Stephen D. Kelson, Where Many Litigators Still Fear To Tread: Adapting to Mediation, UTAH 
B.J. 14 (Nov./Dec. 2012) (arguing that attorneys often obstruct the mediation process by 
intentionally and unintentionally employing contentious tactics when they fail to prepare for 
mediation); Art Hinshaw, Doing the Right Thing: An Empirical Study of Attorney Negotiation 
Ethics, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 95, 152-53 (2011) (discussing to what extent lawyers can (and 
believe they can) posture and exaggerate in caucused mediation), citing ABA Comm. On Ethics and 
Prof’l Responsibility, Formal Ops. 93-370 (1993), 06-439 (2006). 
 78. Ellen Deason points out that confidentiality in mediation may “hinder accurate decision 
making,” undermine democratic values of participation and accountability, and hide conduct or 
statements that should, as a normative matter, be disclosed. Ellen E. Deason, The Need for Trust as a 
Justification for Confidentiality in Mediation: A Cross-Disciplinary Approach, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 
1387, 1388 (2006); see also Peter N. Thompson, Enforcing Rights Generated in Court-Connected 
Mediation—Tension Between the Aspirations of a Private Facilitative Process and the Reality of 
Public Adversarial Justice, 19 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 509, 572 (2004) (arguing that court-
connected mediations are “draped with a cloak of secrecy” that allows for efficiency but may not 
comport with society’s expectation of justice).  But see Sarah Rudolph Cole, Protecting 
Confidentiality in Mediation: A Promise Unfulfilled?, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1419, 1420 (2006) 
(arguing that judges often fail “to discourage intentional violations of mediation confidentiality” 
suggesting that the protection is not as robust as it should be). 
 79. Unless, of course, the mediation arrangement is structured as an exercise in collaborative 
law.  See infra text accompanying note 102; see also James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative 
Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolution, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 431 (2002) 
(arguing that, for ADR to be successful, it must be practiced by lawyers and clients who are 
convinced not just of the merits of their case but of the value of finding successful resolutions 
without formal litigation). 
 80. The extent to which lawyers “colonize” and deform alternative processes is an important 
inquiry in ADR.  See, e.g., Debra Berman & James Alfini, Lawyer Colonization of Family 
Mediation: Consequences and Implications, 95 MARQ. L. REV. 887, 922 (2012) (noting that the 
presence of attorneys shifts mediation’s “client-centered” focus to an “attorney-driven process”); 
JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESTORATIVE JUSTICE & RESPONSIVE REGULATION 250 (2002) (arguing that 
lawyers and legal thinking should not dominate ADR processes).  Getting rid of lawyers has its own 
downsides, of course, in that power may shift to the mediator, who may then start looking more like 
a judge than ever.  See, e.g., Ronit Zamir, The Disempowering Relationship Between Mediator 
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Mediators and arbitrators also introduce issues of luck.  As Waldron 
notes, one may be “lucky or unlucky in one’s jury” or judge because judges 
and juries are people making decisions, and the human decision-making 
process is subject to differences in moral values, in individual temperaments, 
in external circumstances, and in a host of other influences that together 
make it impossible to predict with certainty what the outcome of a given 
case will be.81  Of course, procedural and substantive law, not to mention 
legal training and the judicial code, create some permeable parameters for 
adjudication, which may buffer some luck effects.82  Seeing as how 
mediators and arbitrators are not subject to the same (or any) professional 
standards or political accountability as are many judges, there is potentially 
even greater variation in these roles and therefore greater possibility of luck 
effects in those practices.83  Although JAMS and other provider 
organizations provide luck buffers against mediator variability, such as 
research, monitoring, and reputational bonding84 at the high-end of the ADR 
market (e.g., providing profiles of former judges who now specialize in 
high-dollar complex commercial mediation), there are generally no such 
quality control mechanisms at the low end of the ADR market—which 
includes, of course, small claims mediation.85  As Bryant Garthy caustically 
observes: 
 
Neutrality and Judicial Impartiality: Toward a New Mediation Ethic, 11 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 467 
(2011). 
 81. See Waldron, supra note 45. 
 82. Mautner argues that judges in groups are more luck-resistant than judges alone, suggesting 
that their identities as part of a publicly accountable community hedges against arbitrary outcomes.  
See Mautner, supra note 33, at 222-23 (suggesting that one way to reduce luck in the law is to 
capitalize wherever possible on collective judicial training and knowledge, such as by convening 
large panels). 
 83. I do not want to overstate the wilderness.  There are model standards for mediation, see 
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2007), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute_resolution/model_standa
rds_conduct_april2007.authcheckdam.pdf, and many programs have standards and rules for their 
affiliated members.  See infra text accompanying note 183.  In addition, legal remedies are available 
for truly egregious mediator conduct—though it must be truly egregious.  See, e.g., Michael Moffitt, 
Ten Ways To Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 81 (2003). 
 84. A professional’s interest in her own reputation should help align her incentives and actions 
with the interests of her clients and her firm.  Her reputation serves as a “bond” with clients and 
colleagues, both because her good reputation precedes her and because she will want to continue 
having a good reputation.  See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm 
Structure, 84 VA. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1998), citing Milton C. Regan, Jr., Professional Reputation: 
Looking for the Good Lawyer, 39 S. TEX. L. REV. 549, 565-66 (1998). 
 85. See JAMS: The Resolution Experts, JAMS Career Center, 
http://www.jamsadr.com/careers/xpqGC.aspx?xpST=CareersOverview (last visited Aug. 8, 2013) 
(“JAMS looks to attract, train, develop and retain the most competent, productive professionals in 
order to maintain our status as ‘The Resolution Experts’.”). 
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[Mandatory m]ediation allows courts to dump some cases that judges do not want, and it 
also makes a place for relatively marginal members of the legal profession to be 
deputized as mediators.  These individuals succeed in [what amounts to the bare 
minimum in terms of qualifications:] going through a training session and getting on an 
appropriate list.86 
Garthy notes that the “oversupply” of low-end mediators and the lack of 
“general accountability” by these mediators for their work make it difficult 
for lawyers, much less unrepresented parties, to know whether a mediator 
will be “good or bad,”87 and consequently choosing one unknown mediator 
over another is basically a roll of the dice.  This is not to say that all small 
claims mediations are bad or unlucky; it is only to point out that the 
variability of mediation quality, particularly in the lower segment of court-
connected ADR processes, makes luck a larger factor in outcomes. 
Finally, even the best-intentioned alternative process may exert 
significant pressure to settle, whether foisted onto the parties by the 
mediator, intentionally or otherwise, or more self-imposed, particularly for 
the unrepresented non-repeat-player, because of confusing background rules 
around legal and alternative processes.88  As Deborah Hensler points out, 
parties in court-connected mediation may expect (mistakenly) that the 
process will be adjudicated by legal norms and therefore will not necessarily 
understand that they themselves are responsible for devising a solution to the 
problem.89  In this situation, the more familiar background rules of the court 
(single adjudicator, binding result) are in conflict with the arguably less 
familiar norms of the court-connected alternative process.90  One possible 
 
 86. Bryant G. Garthy, Tilting the Justice System: From ADR as Idealistic Movement to a 
Segmented Market in Dispute Resolution, 18 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 927, 938 (2002). 
 87. Id. 
 88. See, e.g., Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, The Merger of Law and Mediation: Lessons from 
Equity Jurisprudence and Roscoe Pound, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 57 (2004) (arguing that 
mediation’s connection to traditional adjudication threatens mediation’s ability to provide 
individualized justice). 
 89. See Deborah R. Hensler, Suppose It’s Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, 2002 J. 
DISP. RESOL. 81, 95 (2002); see also Richard C. Reuben, Constitutional Gravity: A Unitary Theory 
of Alternative Dispute Resolution and Public Civil Justice, 47 UCLA L. REV. 949, 988 (2000) 
(noting that “voluntary usage” of ADR remains low despite institutional enthusiasm for the practice). 
 90. See, e.g., Wayne D. Brazil, Hosting Mediations as a Representative of the System of Civil 
Justice, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 227, 234 (2007) (pointing out that court-connected make it 
more likely that parties will see mediators as “agent[s] and representative[s] of the court”).  The 
situationist literature on cognitive preferences and schemas argues that we bring pre-existing 
knowledge structures to new situations that make it difficult to comprehend the new situation on its 
own terms.  See Ronald Chen & Jon Hanson, Categorically Biased: The Influence of Knowledge 
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result of this confusion is that an unfamiliar party will look to the mediator 
as the adjudicator (despite the mediator’s protestations to the contrary) and 
misread or overweight the mediator’s statements.  Another possible result is 
that the unfamiliar party will assume that settlement is not optional (despite 
the mediator’s protestations to the contrary) and thus agree to a bad deal.  
Regardless of the source, pressure to settle is at odds with mediation’s 
foundational precepts of value creation and autonomy.91 This disconnect 
creates spaces for chance that can lead to unpredictable, arbitrary, unfair 
outcomes, just as with legal luck.  Put another way, “ADR luck” presents 
predicaments like that of Ms. P: a consensual process, a consensual 
agreement, and an (arguably) unjust outcome.92 
Yet legal luck and ADR luck are not entirely the same. As noted above, 
one prominent construction of applied justice is comparative justice (“like 
cases treated alike”).  But integrative ADR recognizes a range of possible 
outcomes that would be better than the bottom-line reservation value, and 
this is true even in dispute resolution contexts.93  Therefore it is not always 
possible to compare outcomes meaningfully, particularly if there is a 
working assumption that the dispute itself is private and context-specific to 
 
Structures on Law and Legal Theory, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1129 (2004) (defining the situational 
character and “critical realism” as a theoretical approach to legal studies); see also Zamir, supra note 
80, at 468 (arguing that mediator neutrality is too closely linked to judicial impartiality and may not, 
therefore, “advance[] the empowering and effective participation from disadvantaged groups”).  It 
gets even more confusing when judges sit as mediators in court-connected processes.  See, e.g., Ed 
Brunet, Judicial Mediation and Signaling, 3 NEV. L.J. 232, 236 (2002) (describing the judicial 
mediator as someone who, unlike a more traditional private mediator, is highly directive and does 
most of the talking). 
 91. See, e.g., Brazil, supra note 90, at 244-50 (explaining why settlement is not an appropriate 
goal for mediators); but see Stephen B. Goldberg & Margaret L. Shaw, Is the Mediator’s Primary 
Goal To Settle the Dispute?, 15 NO. 2 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 16 (2009) (responding to Brazil’s position 
and attempting to reconcile the mediator’s settlement goals with mediation’s core principles). 
 92. I say “arguably” because some ADR diehards and some classic law & econ types are 
going to claim that the outcome must be just because she agreed to it, and therefore it must have 
addressed core interests that may not even have been known to her.  However, Professor Bagchi 
points out that modern economic theory supports a more moderated view of consent that takes into 
account “arbitrary elements.”  Bagchi, supra note 9, at 1897.  Information costs, cognitive biases and 
limitations, and transaction costs (related to one’s ability to manage contingencies in advance) all 
impinge upon the voluntariness of contract and consent.  Id. 
 93. See, e.g., Multidisciplinary Context, supra note 4, at 10 (pointing out that “particular 
processes do affect outcomes” and that “process pluralism” supports the careful tailoring of process 
to disputants); see also Danya Shocair Reda, Critical Conflicts Between First-Wave and Feminist 
Critical Approaches to Alternative Dispute Resolution, 20 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 193 (2011) 
(theorizing feminism’s embrace of ADR as the result of similar affinities and attention to the special 
case of the individual); Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Mothers and Fathers of Invention: The Intellectual 
Founders of ADR, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 1, 36 (2000) (emphasizing that alternative 
practice does not necessary promote compromise but instead can foster “creative solutions and 
integrative outcomes”). 
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the individuals involved.94  Accordingly, comparative justice has less 
relevance and meaning in such processes.  In fact, some of the most 
trenchant critiques of court-connected mediation note that mediation has 
become, in the hands of repeat players such as professional mediators and 
lawyers, a pallid reflection of litigation practice and values.95  The mediator 
who adopts a narrow problem definition that tracks legally relevant issues 
and does not consider the future relationship of the parties, for example, may 
have consistent results in roughly similar cases but is not making space for 
extralegal concerns that may be important to the parties in the room.96  On 
this view, mediation is failing to live up to its promise not because it is too 
variable, but because it is not variable enough. 
This is not to say, however, that comparative justice has no meaning in 
ADR.  “Like cases should be treated alike” glosses the vast frontier of 
justice-as-fairness.  Fairness is a bedrock value in ADR processes as well.97  
Although ADR processes may explicitly leave room for cases articulating 
themselves as more different than they might initially seem, based on 
circumstances and personalities and relevant interests involved, these are 
intentional variations from what might be thought of as a baseline minimum 
result.  On this view, unintentional variations (luck) that lead to 
unpredictable, arbitrary, or unfair results are not defensible in ADR. 
Other differences between legal luck and ADR luck are inherent to 
process differences between the two.  At the micro level of process design, 
for example, ADR designers may seek to eliminate some kinds of luck 
effects (say, by promulgating mediator credentials in a particular jurisdiction 
for court-connected mediation) while intentionally making room for more 
beneficial luck effects, such as serendipity.98  Creativity and flexibility are 
 
 94. See, e.g., Kruse, supra note 5 (rejecting the “correct outcome” form of substantive justice 
in favor of a theory emphasizing just harmony, authentic participation, and appropriate fit). 
 95. See, e.g., Riskin & Welsh, supra note 75. 
 96. Id.; see also Michal Alberstein, The Jurisprudence of Mediation: Between Formalism, 
Feminism and Identity Conversations, 11 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 1, 19 (2009) (describing 
mediation as “an alternative to mainstream jurisprudential thinking” in that it makes space for, 
among other things, discourse and emotions). 
 97. See, e.g., FISHER & URY, supra note 64, at 12 (“Insist on using objective criteria.”). 
 98. Serendipity is “the accidental discovery of something that, post hoc, turns out to be 
valuable.” Miguel Pina e Cunha et al., On Serendipity and Organizing, 28 EUR. MGMT. J. 319, 320 
(2010).  Scholars writing on serendipity often point out that processes can be calibrated to be more 
or less receptive to serendipitous insights.  See generally ROBERT K. MERTON & ELINOR BARBER, 
THE TRAVELS AND ADVENTURES OF SERENDIPITY: A STUDY IN SOCIOLOGICAL SEMANTICS AND THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF SCIENCE 2004 (“The research director … can create a suitable atmosphere for the 
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key process skills in ADR, skills that almost by definition will lead to highly 
individuated, differentiated outcomes.  Overformal and too-scripted 
processes are unlikely to provide the right environment for thinking outside 
the box.99  Furthermore, ADR contemplates the possibility that outcomes 
may even come about as the result of “random” decision-making, such as 
flipping a coin or relying on another fairness-based process norm, if indeed 
the parties involved agree that no other relevant objective criteria exist that 
could inform the decision-making process.100 
Finally, at the macro level of process, legal luck and ADR luck resonate 
slightly differently.  Many forms of ADR, particularly forms based on 
integrative bargaining and interest-based mediation, intentionally 
acknowledge and embrace variation and variability, as evidenced by the 
proliferation of alternative processes and the field’s commitment to 
pluralism and value neutrality.101  Recognizing that existing procedures may 
not suit exactly the dispute or disputants involved, ADR process designers 
and scholars routinely leverage legal and ADR luck risks into an opportunity 
for reenvisioning and redesigning dispute resolution processes.  In this way, 
bad luck becomes the rationale for process innovation—something that 
happens much more easily and readily than changes to traditional litigation. 
Consider the example of collaborative law.  Collaborative law practice, 
in which the parties’ lawyers contractually disqualify themselves from 
representing the parties in litigation and thus create an incentive to negotiate 
as cooperatively as possible, arose in part because Stuart Webb, a divorce 
 
making of accidental discoveries by giving his researchers, within broad limits, the autonomy to 
decide what is ‘interesting’ … ); Michael H. Hoeflich, Serendipity in the Stacks, Fortuity in the 
Archives, 99 LAW LIBR. J. 813, 826 (2007) (arguing that overly-rational disposal policies will make 
it harder to make serendipitous discoveries). 
 99. See id.; see also Jennifer Gerarda Brown, Creativity and Problem-Solving, 87 MARQ. L. 
REV. 697, 697 (2004) (“Negotiation experts seem to agree that creative solutions are often the key to 
reaching value-maximizing outcomes in integrative, interest-based bargaining.”); Carrie Menkel-
Meadow, Aha? Is Creativity Possible in Legal Problem Solving and Teachable in Legal Education?, 
6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 97, 144 (2001) (answer: maybe). 
 100. See, e.g., Ken Belson, What? No Rock, Paper, Scissors?, at 
http://london2012.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/what-no-rock-paper-scissors/ (June 24, 2012) 
(describing new tie-breaking rule in Olympic qualifying event specifying either a runoff or a coin 
toss); Carol Vogel, Rock, Paper, Payoff: Child’s Play Wins Auction House an Art Sale, at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/29/arts/design/29scis.html?_r=0 (Apr. 29, 2005) (describing rock-
paper-scissors game played by Christie’s and Sotheby’s to determine which auction house would sell 
a Japanese company’s art collection). 
 101. See, e.g., Multidisciplinary Context, supra note 4.  Developments in transformative and 
narrative mediation—both of which emphasize the unique individuals and relationships in a 
particular dispute—serve as examples of ADR’s tendencies toward reforming process and notions of 
fairness and justice in outcomes.  See JOHN WINSLADE & GERALD MONK, PRACTICING NARRATIVE 
MEDIATION: LOOSENING THE GRIP OF CONFLICT (2008) (describing narrative mediation objectives 
and approaches); BUSH & FOLGER, supra note 67 (describing same for transformative mediation). 
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lawyer, was disillusioned with what appeared to be the inescapable 
sharpness of attorneys even in non-litigation settings.102  Adversarial systems 
are prone to luck problems because they overemphasize procedural rules, 
narrow problems along legal lines, and typically favor the better-heeled 
party.  Webb believed that taking away the threat of going to court was the 
only way for lawyers to engage wholeheartedly in interest-based bargaining 
and dispute resolution processes.103  Although collaborative law introduces 
its own set of problems, it provides a useful example of ADR’s agility in the 
face of undesirable luck distortions.104 
It is hard to be innovative, however, if nothing appears to be wrong. In 
consent-based systems, recognizing problems can be difficult given the 
priority that modern neoliberal society places on individual choice105 and the 
belief that some measure of serendipitous luck is intrinsic to ADR.  If the 
parties agree, then we assume nothing is broken.  Theories of luck, however, 
create new space to reevaluate this assumption. 
B. The Garage Door Mediation: Luck at Work 
Consider again the garage door mediation.  On the day of her hearing, P 
was alone in an unfamiliar environment, afraid to appear before the judge. 
Waiting at the court, she saw the sign for mediation and asked for a 
mediator.  After participating in mediation, P agreed to all of Q’s demands 
and more. 
Here we see three significant lucky (unchosen) moments.  First, P was 
alone and scared at the courthouse.  As it turned out, P was alone only 
because her son, who intended to accompany her, was out of town on the 
 
 102. See Ted Schneyer, The Organized Bar and the Collaborative Law Movement: A Study in 
Professional Change, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 289 (2008) (describing collaborative law’s origins, 
development, and ongoing challenges). 
 103. Of course, as people have pointed out, collaborative law practice does not necessarily 
accomplish this goal.  If one side decides to abandon the mediation, for example, both sides must 
retain new counsel and this additional expense could greatly disadvantage the side with fewer 
resources.  Additionally, the practice has raised ethical concerns about the lawyer’s responsibility to 
the client.  At present, only in family law—the most cutting edge arena of alternative law practices—
is collaborative law even a possible option. 
 104. See, e.g., Ellen E. Deason, State Court ADR: Probate, Family, Other Specialized Courts 
Are a Key Source of Innovation, 6 NO. 1 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 6 (1999) (describing the “fertile 
ground” state courts provide for process innovations). 
 105. See Amy J. Cohen, Dispute Systems Design, Neoliberalism, and the Problem of Scale, 14 
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 51, 56-58 (2009) (explaining how neoliberal values around individual 
freedom and efficiency resonate with much ADR thinking). 
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date the hearing was scheduled.  No other family members were around that 
summer and she was too embarrassed to ask a friend to come along.  The 
absence of trusted family members and the fact of being in small claims 
court in the first place both qualify as “circumstantial luck,” defined 
generally as the “kinds of problems and situations one faces.”106  
Additionally, P’s shame with respect to facing the judge (surely not an 
idiosyncratic reaction but predictable as a matter of system design107) 
provides an example of what Nagel calls “constitutive luck”—the type of 
person P is, her capacities and temperament, that determine her responses to 
circumstances.108  These observations about constitutive and circumstantial 
luck may seem unremarkable, considering that first-time disputants are 
probably often alone and feeling scared.  Indeed, part of the rationale for 
alternative processes (and the reason P asked for mediation here) arguably is 
to offer a less frightening, more humane option, to offset the luck distortions 
that arise from anxiety in adjudicative settings. 
Which brings us to the second lucky moment: P asks for mediation and 
receives M. This may seem like an exercise in agency, but at this particular 
court, parties are assigned mediators randomly (circumstantial luck) and so P 
and Q “chose” mediation and ended up with someone who turned out to be 
the sort of mediator who takes a strong hand in pushing the parties toward 
settlement but then leaves the actual details of the settlement to the parties 
(circumstantial luck combined with causal luck, Nagel’s term for how 
circumstances influence agency).  The same exercise of agency could have 
resulted in a different mediator, which makes this moment particularly 
lucky.  As noted earlier, mediators vary widely in terms of approach and 
training.  Different mediators may have paced the process differently, 
emphasized settlement less (or more), or focused more time on relationship 
building and communication.  Given the constitutive posture of P, these 
kinds of circumstantial differences (and note, these differences are an 
example of “ADR luck” insofar as processes and professional norms are 
unregulated in ADR) could have had a meaningful impact on the outcome of 
the mediation. 
And finally, the third lucky moment took place when P did not ask for 
an offset for the door, because (as she reported later) she did not think to ask 
and the meeting felt like it was coming to a close (constitutive, 
circumstantial, causal).  As an objective matter, the resultant agreement was 
not favorable to P and hence the “resultant luck” for P was poor.109 This 
 
 106. See NAGEL, supra note 29, at 28. 
 107. See Ackerman, supra note 16. 
 108. See NAGEL, supra note 29, at 28. 
 109. Id. 
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combination of chosen and unchosen (lucky) factors led to P and Q settling 
quickly, even if the settlement was questionable because it awarded the cost 
of the door and interest and the door itself to Q.  The questionable settlement 
seemed even worse a week later, when Q picked up the door, gloated about 
his windfall, and then drove away before P could respond, a kind of replay 
of the mediation drive-by that had happened the week before. 
From the standpoint of justice, separate from whether legal remedies are 
available or ADR process norms were adequately met, what happened in the 
garage door mediation is wholly deficient.  Q, the putative bad actor, 
prevails; P, the more socially marginalized and disempowered party, pays 
more than she owes and then must endure Q’s subsequent jibes; and M, the 
facilitator turned evaluator, fails to address adequately any of the relational 
concerns presented by the repeat-player-versus-first-timer dynamic while 
pushing for settlement, therefore perhaps undermining some of the core 
practices and beliefs of mediation itself.  These injustices in process and 
outcome are arguably products of the various luck distortions running amok 
throughout the proceedings, as described above.  It is easy to imagine that 
adjusting any of those three lucky moments in another direction could have 
led to a different outcome. 
A luck-based analysis of the garage door mediation, therefore, suggests 
that the outcome was highly contingent and therefore not an exercise of 
justice, which in turn throws the legitimacy of small claims mediation into 
question.  Yet how could this situation be unjust?  P consented throughout—
and not only that, she was often the first mover.  She, not Q, asked for 
mediation.  She, not Q, insisted that he take the door away.  Perhaps the 
apparent lopsidedness of the settlement does not reflect the actual value she 
placed on avoiding the judge and on having the door taken away.  Indeed, 
her consent suggests that she did receive equivalent value, because otherwise 
she would not have consented. Put another way, even assuming all the luck 
distortions listed above, the fact of P’s multiple consents throughout the 
process resists the conclusion that the end result was lucky and unjust. 
These dueling interpretations (luck or consent? determinism or free 
will?) suggest the next question: does consent actually fix luck problems in 
ADR?  The next Part builds upon the foregoing discussion of luck by 
focusing on consent and on the relationship between luck and consent, 
specifically whether and how much consent buffers the process and 
substance of court-connected ADR from luck. 
29
Reynolds: Luck v. Justice: Consent Intervenes, but for Whom?
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2014
 274 
III. DOES CONSENT FIX LUCK PROBLEMS IN ALTERNATIVE PROCESSES? 
Broadly speaking, consent is a doctrinal device that operationalizes the 
notion of free will into an Anglo-American legal framework.110  When we 
consent to something, we have made (or are assumed to have made) a 
decision based on the information we have, which means that we have also 
decided (or are assumed to have decided) that the information we have is 
sufficient for the choice at hand.  Agency, actual or assumed, provides one 
of the most familiar narratives of legal consciousness in the West. 
In consent-based dispute resolution processes, such as mediation, 
consent presumably eliminates luck by empowering the parties to decide, 
based on their own individual interests and values, how to structure 
proposals and whether proposals are acceptable.  The unconsented-to bad 
luck that may have contributed to the original dispute—having a neighbor 
who won’t prune his overgrown bushes, or losing a limb in a wrong-side 
amputation case, or not having enough money to pay employees when the 
economy goes bad—is not the focus here, other than to point out that our 
analysis of consent in procedural law often presumes some unconsented-to 
bad luck from the get-go, which could in turn impose limiting schemas on 
disputants and thus inhibit autonomous self-expression in the dispute 
resolution context.111  That said, this Part focuses more on the interaction of 
consent and luck after the dispute starts. 
This Part will first examine the centrality of consent to mediation theory 
and practice.  Consent is important in many forms of ADR (such as 
negotiation and arbitration, for example) but is particularly salient in 
mediation because of mediation’s emphasis on self-determination.  After this 
preliminary discussion, the Part will move on to explore how consent works 
to buffer luck in mediation.  The Part will then consider in more detail some 
of the fault lines in the consent buffer, starting with the unavoidable 
ambiguities of the concept of consent and then moving into the process 
challenges of collecting meaningful consent in court-connected mediation. 
 
 110. See, e.g., Gary Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1203 
(1985) (describing legally effective consent as dependent on judicial presumption of free will). 
 111. See Chen & Hanson, supra note 90; see also Jon Hanson, The Situational Character: A 
Critical Realist Perspective on the Human Animal, 93 GEO. L.J. 1, 23 (2004) (describing people as 
“cognitive misers” who have trouble seeing things as they are); see also DEAN G. PRUITT & SUNG 
HEE KIM, SOCIAL CONFLICT: ESCALATION, STALEMATE, AND SETTLEMENT 22 (3d ed., 2004) 
(linking conflict to the development of hostile attitudes that can lead to zero-sum thinking “which 
tends to make problem solving seem like an unworkable alternative”); Arthur Pearlstein, Pursuit of 
Happiness and Resolution of Conflict: An Agenda for the Future of ADR, 12 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 
215, 232-33 (2012) (explaining how zero-sum mindsets arising from apparently adversarial 
situations contributes to unhappiness). 
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A. Example: Mediation and Consent 
Mediation is “the intervention of an acceptable, impartial, and neutral 
third party who has no authoritative decision-making power to assist 
contending parties in voluntarily reaching their own mutually acceptable 
settlement of issues in dispute.”112  All forms of mediation, from community 
mediation to complex multiparty mediation, share basic ingredients: an 
impartial mediator with no legal authority to bind the parties; disputants who 
may choose to walk away from a proposed agreement or at any point in the 
process provided that, in certain circumstances, they have made a good-faith 
effort to mediate; and the possibility of creative agreements that may address 
more than just the legally relevant issues at stake.  Within the American 
legal system, the incorporation of mediation and other alternative processes 
was a transformative shift in the resolution of disputes.113  Mediation 
reprioritized the components of conventional dispute resolution by putting 
the participants and their interests, preferences, values, and relationship at 
the top; legal rules and institutions and service providers were thus relegated 
to more supporting positions.114 
1. Consent as Philosophical Linchpin of Mediation 
Consent freely given is foundational to mediation.  The Model 
Standards of Conduct for Mediators identifies nine standards of mediation, 
with three among them of primary importance: self-determination, informed 
consent, and impartiality.115  These three principles did not originate with the 
Model Standards but rather have been cornerstones of mediation theory and 
practice for decades.116  These three principles overlap and each relies upon 
a robust notion of consent in order to function properly. 
 
 112. CHRISTOPHER W. MOORE, THE MEDIATION PROCESS: PRACTICAL STRATEGIES FOR 
RESOLVING CONFLICT 6 (1986). 
 113. See, e.g., Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute 
Resolution Movement Is Re-shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165 (2003). 
 114. See sources cited supra note 62. 
 115. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators (2007), available at 
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/2011_build/dispute_resolution/model_standa
rds_conduct_april2007.authcheckdam.pdf.  Michael Moffitt and Andrea Schneider pull out these 
three standards (plus confidentiality) as the most important.  See EXAMPLES & EXPLANATIONS: 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION 92-95 (Michael L. Moffitt & Andrea Kupfer Schneider eds., 2011). 
 116. Self-determination is “the fundamental principle of mediation.”  Nancy A. Welsh, The 
Thinning Vision of Self-Determination in Court-Connected Mediation: The Inevitable Price of 
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The first principle, self-determination, refers to the right to make 
autonomous choices about one’s own life.  Building upon Bush and Folger’s 
definition, Nancy Welsh describes the development of the modern concept 
of self-determination in mediation like so: 
[M]any mediation advocates envisioned party self-determination as involving more than 
just the disputants’ passive ability to respond to the particular settlement proposal put 
before them.  Rather, self-determination in mediation involved party empowerment that 
‘restor[ed] to individuals .†.†. a sense of their own value and strength and own capacity 
to handle life’s problems.’  It promised disputants the opportunity to participate actively 
and directly in the process of resolving their dispute, control the substantive norms 
guiding their discussion and decision-making, create the options for settlement, and 
control the final outcome of the dispute resolution process.117 
Consent, particularly informed consent, is essential in self-
determination. Without informed consent, which entails 
appropriate levels of information or sufficient competency to make 
choices, an individual cannot exercise true self-determination, because she 
may not understand how the process works, what the issues are, or whether 
the proposed outcome actually meets her interests.118 
The second principle, impartiality, also implicates consent.  Impartiality 
means that the mediator must not have a stake in the dispute or its 
outcome.119  Without impartiality, a mediator could, intentionally or not, 
push the parties to solutions that they otherwise would not choose.  Such 
mediator interference could have an adverse impact on the voluntariness of 
the parties’ consent and thus threaten the parties’ overall self-determination. 
As Joseph Stulberg writes, mediators who wish to intervene in the parties’ 
decisions around process and outcomes are violating the core principle of 
impartiality (he calls it neutrality): 
If the parties wanted a decision-maker, they could create a process to deliver it. But what 
is central to mediation—I believe its driving value—is that it systematically supports 
individuals or groups to exercise their freedom and to take responsibility for making 
decisions regarding how they choose to move forward. It requires engaged participation 
 
Institutionalization?, 6 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001) [hereinafter  Thinning Vision], quoting 
Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, supra note 115, at §1 (Joint Committee of Delegates 
from American Arbitration Association, American Bar Association, and Society of Professionals in 
Dispute Resolution 1994). 
 117. Thinning Vision, supra note 116, at 17-18 (quoting partially Robert A. Baruch Bush & 
Joseph P. Folger, Promise of mediation 1(1994)) 
 118. “Without [informed consent], mediation’s promises of autonomy and self-determination 
are empty.” Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle for Truly 
Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 840 (1999) [hereinafter Informed 
Consent]. 
 119. See Moffitt & Schneider, supra note 115, at 92-93. 
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that leads to outcomes for which each negotiator is accountable. To promote those central 
elements, the mediator must remain neutral.120 
The third principle, informed consent, refers to the conditions, both 
internal and external, that make self-determination possible.  This principle 
recognizes that consent is meaningless without a basic understanding of 
context, priorities, and options.  Informed consent, therefore, is a concept 
about  what it means to make meaningful choices in pursuit of self-
determination.121  In her seminal article on knowledgeable decision-making 
in mediation, Jacqueline Nolan-Haley defines informed consent like so: 
Informed consent is an ethical, moral, and legal concept that is deeply ingrained in 
American culture.  In those transactions where informed consent is required, the legal 
doctrine requires that individuals who give consent be competent, informed about the 
particular intervention, and consent voluntarily.  Informed consent is the foundational 
moral and ethical principle that promotes respect for individual self-determination and 
honors human dignity.122 
As Nolan-Haley points out, informed consent typically assumes a 
professional-client relationship and has two parts: disclosure and voluntary 
consent.  Disclosure is the responsibility of the professional, such as the 
physician or lawyer, who must provide particular sorts of information to the 
client; voluntary consent is the province of the client, assumed to be a stable 
and rational individual, who receives, understands, and appreciates the 
information before choosing to agree to the proposed treatment or 
approach.123 
Consent is therefore the philosophical linchpin of mediation.  Without a 
genuine commitment to autonomous non-coerced self-determination in 
mediation—that is, without prioritizing party control and decision-making 
over process and outcomes— mediation is no better than an adversarial 
process with a third-party decision-maker.  In fact, if there were no self-
determination, mediations would be much worse because mediation 
proceedings are private and do not have the same formal safeguards for 
participants that litigation has, such as the rules of evidence or the option to 
 
 120. Joseph B. Stulberg, Must a Mediator Be Neutral? You Better Believe It!, 95 MARQ. L. 
REV. 829, 857 (2012).  Stulberg draws a distinction between “neutrality” and “impartiality” by 
noting that a mediator might pressure parties equally (and thus be “impartial”) but still interfere with 
the parties’ decision-making (and thus not “neutral”).. Id. at 835.  This Article uses the two terms 
interchangeably, both meaning “neutrality” in the Stulberg sense. 
 121. See Moffitt & Schneider, supra note 115, at 94-95. 
 122. Informed Consent, supra note 118, at 781. 
 123. See id. at 799-800. 
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appeal.  Whether the parties have exercised autonomy and self-
determination in mediation is not outwardly visible other than by their 
consent.  As such, consent is not just a theoretical or psychological construct 
but an external choice, an action in the world, connecting who someone is 
with what he does.124 
And if the reverse is true—that is, if what someone does constitutes and 
reconstitutes who he is—then the importance of freely-given and fully-
informed consent is even greater, assuming Western humanistic, neoliberal 
values.  On this view, anything that cheapens or devalues individual consent, 
either as a substantive matter or as part of a procedural mechanism, not only 
worsens our individual lives but also eviscerates democratic participation 
and the collective experience.  The adhesion consumer contract, for 
example, may be a wonderfully efficient tool but is an absolute travesty 
when it comes to consent.  Adhesion contracts hold consumers to 
agreements they had no idea they were making and, prospectively, lead 
consumers to believe that they are powerless to negotiate or protest within 
the marketplace.  Mediation and other alternative dispute resolution 
processes have historically striven to hold the line against such harmful 
efficiencies, rightly recognizing that the value of alternative processes is in 
their actual, not pro forma or boilerplate, commitment to consent, 
impartiality, and self-determination.125 
2. Consent as Process Enabler in Mediation 
The importance of consent in mediation is evident from the amount of 
consenting that a mediator asks mediation participants to do.  Disputants 
who go through civil mediation typically give their consent not just once but 
rather at various points in the dispute resolution process.  Nolan-Haley has 
laid out these consent points in terms of mediator disclosures.  On this view, 
party consent is a function of the mediator expressly or impliedly providing 
 
 124. This touches back upon the moral luck literature.  Martha Nussbaum notes that the 
Aristotelian concepts of the good life (arête) and happiness (eudaimonia) are not solely intrinsic 
qualities but require actions that lead to outcomes that are then evaluated as good or bad, and so both 
concepts are vulnerable to contingencies in a way that Kantians would find intolerable.  Martha C. 
Nussbaum, Luck and Ethics, in MORAL LUCK 77-78 (Daniel Statman ed., 1993). On this view, the 
person of good character who falls into a coma and sleeps for his entire adult life, for example, has 
not lived virtuously.  “[Aristotle’s] point is that the endowment and condition [of good character] are 
not sufficient for praise: the person has to do something, show how he or she can be active. … 
Character alone is not sufficient.”  Id. at 83. 
 125. See, e.g., Harrington & Merry, supra note 69. 
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information that permits parties to decide whether to go forward with 
mediation.126 
a.  Early.  Consent to start mediation happens early in the process, 
sometimes before a dispute occurs.  Pre-dispute mediation provisions in 
contracts allow parties to specify mediation as the method of dispute 
resolution before anything has gone wrong between them.  Even without 
these pre-dispute agreements to mediate, once a dispute occurs, one party 
might ask the other about trying mediation before filing a lawsuit.  
Additionally, parties who have filed a lawsuit and are still in pre-trial 
litigation may decide to mediate, or the court may order mediation, in which 
the party trades its short-term consent for the ability to return to court if the 
mediation does not produce an acceptable outcome.  If the court orders 
mediation then consent did not enable that part of the process; in non-
mandatory settings, however, party consent may be thought of as kicking off 
the mediation process. 
b.  During.  Once disputants have decided to mediate, but before they 
have come to a proposed agreement, there are ongoing opportunities for 
consent throughout.  This post-entry, pre-agreement “participation 
consent”127 is the parties’ agreement to continue participating in the 
mediation. 
As a matter of practice, many mediators periodically check in with the 
parties and make sure that they are still on board with the process, 
particularly when moving from one stage of the mediation to the next (e.g.: 
“Now that we have heard from both of you about X, let’s talk a minute about 
Y, if that works for you  One example of participation consent arises when 
mediators present to the parties a problem-solving question that synthesizes 
the dispute into a more workable formulation for problem solving and 
negotiation.128  Mediators who follow this practice often seek express 
agreement around the problem-solving question before moving forward.129  
 
 126. Professor Nolan-Haley separates consent into those arising at “participation disclosures” 
(both before the mediation and during the mediation) and those arising at “outcome disclosures” 
(after an agreement is proposed but before agreeing).  Informed Consent, supra note 118, at 817-18. 
 127. Id. at 820. 
 128. This is how some mediation trainings, such as the one hosted semiannually at the 
University of Oregon, trains people.  See UNIVERSITY OF OREGON SCHOOL OF LAW, BASIC 
MEDIATION TRAINING MANUAL 41 (2010) (on file with author). The “problem-solving question” 
may be an example of impartiality but not neutrality in the Stulberg sense because it crystallizes the 
parties’ dispute into a single core question that necessarily deemphasizes the other features of the 
dispute. 
 129. Id. 
35
Reynolds: Luck v. Justice: Consent Intervenes, but for Whom?
Published by Pepperdine Digital Commons, 2014
 280 
Moreover, a mediator may need to seek more explicit consent if she 
significantly changes the course of the mediation or adopts a new style, such 
as when parties ask facilitative mediators to provide a midstream evaluation 
of the case.130  Lela Love and John Cooley note that the dangers of such a 
shift may give rise to a legal duty to warn and the mediator should therefore 
seek informed consent from participants before agreeing to provide an 
evaluation.131 
c.  At the end.  The third type of consent in mediation, what Nolan-
Haley calls “outcome consent,” is the choice to accept the proposed 
agreement, perhaps after going through multiple rounds of amendment and 
analysis against one’s interests.132  Outcome consent means not only that the 
parties understand and appreciate the consequences of the agreement, but 
that they willingly bind themselves to the provisions therein.  The parties 
must also understand that they do not have to agree during mediation, but 
can opt for traditional litigation instead.  Given all this, once parties give 
outcome consent and come away with an agreement, it is very difficult for 
them to undo that agreement if they have memorialized it in a settlement 
contract, as is often the case in small claims settings.133 
The accumulation of repeated consents over the course of the process 
and the apparent strong freedom of contract attitude permeating legal 
relationships at the present moment134 act together to cement the 
 
 130. See, e.g., Cooley & Love, supra note 17, at 13 (scripting out a possible response for a 
facilitative mediator who is asked mid-mediation to provide evaluation); see also Frank E. A. 
Sander, Achieving Meaningful Threshold Consent to Mediator Style(s), 14 NO. 2 DISP. RESOL. MAG. 
8, 10 (2008) (arguing that more training is needed to help mediators learn how to secure effective 
consent vis-à-vis mediation style). 
 131. This consent should be “carefully crafted to describe the precise scope of the consent to an 
evaluative process . . . The scope of a party’s consent should encompass a freely made, voluntary 
decision: (1) to participate in a specific type of evaluative process based on a clear understanding of 
the benefits, limitations, and risks associated with the process; (2) to be satisfied with the specifically 
described role of the neutral and the neutral’s related ethical responsibilities in the evaluative 
process; and (3) to be satisfied with the nature and amount of any additional fees and costs charged 
by the neutral in conducting the evaluative process.” Cooley & Love, supra note 17, at 13. 
 132. Professor Nolan-Haley separates consent to reach an agreement (a type of participation 
consent) from consent to the agreement (outcome consent).  See Informed Consent, supra note 118, 
at 819-20. 
 133. Mediated settlements are not easy to contest afterward.  See, e.g., James R. Coben & Peter 
N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. 
L. REV. 43, 74 (2006) (demonstrating that most contested mediation agreements ultimately are 
enforced by courts). 
 134. The Supreme Court’s recent arbitration jurisprudence provides a useful example.  The 
Court has made a strong effort to ensure that arbitration clauses in contracts are enforced, despite 
state rules or policies seeking to regulate these contracts and the relationships that they determine.  
See Ronald G. Aronovsky, The Supreme Court and the Future of Arbitration: Towards a Preemptive 
Federal Arbitration Procedural Paradigm?, 42 SW. L. REV. 131, 133 (2012) (arguing that the 
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enforceability of the agreement.  As Michael Moffitt has pointed out, this is 
true regardless of how egregiously inadequate the mediator or the process 
may have been.135 
B. Consent in Mediation Should Buffer Luck 
If the purpose of consent in mediation is to facilitate self-determination 
and autonomy; and if luck is the extent to which unchosen inputs affect an 
individual’s situation, then consent in mediation is necessarily in tension 
with luck.  This is true even for good luck.  Unchosen inputs that turn out to 
be good luck and would have been consented to if given  the choice are not 
expressions of individual self-determination or autonomy. 
In the legal arena, luck buffers include devices like ex-ante private 
insurance intended to protect people from unforeseen bad events.  Ex-post 
luck buffers might include government action, such as the bank bailout, 
FEMA responses to hurricane disasters, and the work of decentralized 
nonlegal entities (like charities, churches, families).  The rhetoric of 
American self-reliance exists alongside strong bankruptcy protections, so as 
to encourage productive behavior while predefining what happens if luck 
turns bad.136  Drilling down to civil procedure, the adversarial process is 
governed by rules designed to level the playing field and make sure that the 
competition—not chance—determines the results.137  Likewise, judges are 
careful to support their decisions with reasons and precedent, thus deflecting 
charges of arbitrary or idiosyncratic decision-making.138 
In mediation, one of the primary luck buffers is consent. Consent acts as 
a backstop against chance dictating arbitrary outcomes.  Some unlucky 
 
Supreme Court’s strong protection of contract terms around arbitration undermines state oversight of 
consumer and employee regimes and thus upsets the balance of federalism). 
 135. See Moffitt, supra note 83, at 82 (noting the “historical rarity of suits against mediators”). 
 136. See, e.g., John Fabian Witt, Narrating Bankruptcy/Narrating Risk, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 303, 
306 (2003) (noting that American bankruptcy law “renarrated commercial failures in ways that 
emphasized not self-reliance and fault, but interdependence and inevitability”). 
 137. See, e.g., Allison Orr Larsen, Confronting Supreme Court Fact Finding, 98 VA. L. REV. 
1255, 1294-95 (2012) (explaining how competitive adversarial process is supposed to support truth-
seeking in litigation). 
 138. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 228-32 (1986) (describing the judicial 
process as a “chain novel” in which judges provide new chapters constrained in part by what has 
happened in the story already).  But see Stefanie A. Lindquist & Frank B. Cross, Empirically Testing 
Dworkin’s Chain Novel: Studying the Path of Precedent, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1156, 1158 (2005) 
(suggesting that the accumulation of precedents appears to have made it easier for judges to decide 
along ideological, rather than precedential, lines). 
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events might happen during the mediation, but because being at the 
mediation, staying at the mediation, and coming to agreement are all 
ultimately matters of choice, then the presumption is that the outcome was 
consensual.  More specifically, consent buffers luck in three different ways: 
by mitigating legal luck, by deemphasizing the power of the mediator, and 
by making possible a customizable process tailored to the specific needs of 
the parties. 
First, consent-based processes, such as mediation, buffer legal luck by 
providing a decentralized option to luck-riddled traditional legal processes.  
The mediation option avoids the legal presets by promoting individual 
priorities and encouraging a broader array of possible resolutions.  Parties in 
mediation do not have to take the chance at an unfavorable outcome in court. 
Mediation offers, as an institutional matter, the opportunity for parties to 
engage in a process that can support both parties’ self-determination.  To 
keep people interested in the mediation option, mediation has its own 
organizational incentives to make sure that luck does not dictate outcomes. 
Second, within the mediation process itself, consent buffers luck by 
deemphasizing the power of the mediator.  Because the parties can walk 
away from mediation at any time, the parties should know that the mediator 
has no formal authority to resolve the dispute.  Additionally, because parties 
have consent power throughout the mediation, they have—or should have—
the ability to make process choices: like determining whether the mediator 
should be more facilitative, more evaluative, or spend more time on 
communication, and so on.139  Although the mediator is likely more than a 
potted plant in the room, the mediator is never empowered as a decision-
maker or judge in the dispute as a matter of law or mediation theory.140 
Finally, consent buffers luck by providing the opportunity for a tailor-
made process that is not arbitrary or limiting, but rather  suits the needs of 
the participants while defining the problem broadly.  Unlike the legal 
system, mediation can address non-legal issues that may be important to the 
parties, such as communication patterns going forward or expressions of 
empathy.141  Affording this level of process control to the parties obviates 
 
 139. See Shestowsky, supra note 15, at 553-54. 
 140. See, e.g., John Lande, Stop Bickering! A Call for Collaboration, 16 ALTERNATIVES TO 
HIGH COST LITIG. 1 (1998) (recounting unflattering characterizations of facilitative mediation, 
“potted plant” being among them). 
 141. As many scholars have pointed out, plaintiffs often want an apology.  Mediation provides 
more opportunities for apologies than litigation.  See, e.g., Jonathan R. Cohen, The Path Between 
Sebastian’s Hospitals: Fostering Reconciliation After a Tragedy, 17 BARRY L. REV. 89 (2011); Jean 
R. Sternlight, Lawyers’ Representation of Clients in Mediation: Using Economics and Psychology 
To Structure Advocacy in a Nonadversarial Setting, 14 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 269, 342 (1999) 
(“In a mediation, the client, in an opening statement or in the course of subsequent discussion, can 
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the luck effects that might accrue from less-relevant process rules as applied 
to the parties. 
Although the mediation process may be customizable, it is not random.  
Law schools and other institutional training venues have developed 
approaches for mediation that generally promulgate the key values (self-
determination, autonomy, and so on) and lay out key process pieces 
(uninterrupted time, interest gathering, and so on) for those interested in 
mediation.142  Although mediators do not need licenses, most court 
mediation programs in the United States do have standards and rules for 
their affiliated mediators.143 
In these ways, consent in mediation works to buffer luck and thereby 
promote autonomy.  The practice has some institutional incentives to keep 
luck out.  In the law, luck is unavoidable as a matter both of line drawing 
and of differences between those empowered to make legal evaluations and 
judgments.  These line drawings should not be as salient in mediation, 
though of course will have an impact on at least some portion of the issues; 
moreover, the differences between third-party decision-makers should be 
much less relevant, because the parties are the ones in control of the process 
and outcome.  The law can bear a certain amount of bad luck (though not too 
much), because it has an institutional credibility that may offset or explain 
away chance as part of the bureaucracy of government.  Mediation is less 
able to bear bad luck, because it does not have a position equivalent to the 
law in the public’s narrative of legal institutions, and more importantly, 
actively publicizes the primacy of self-determinacy and autonomy.  As such, 
mediation relies on consent as a protection against luck distortions in process 
and outcomes. 
 
make it clear that she also cares about nonmonetary relief such as an apology, reinstatement, or 
establishing a new business relationship”). 
 142. See, e.g., Susan Raines, Timothy Hedeen & Ansley Boyd Barton, Best Practices for 
Mediation Training and Regulation: Preliminary Findings, 48 FAM. CT. REV. 541, 551 (2010) 
(noting that “[m]any mediation programs in North America are now more than thirty years old” and 
thus have developed programmatic identities and approaches that should be evaluated in light of 
today’s client goals). 
 143. See, e.g., Nancy A. Welsh, Institutionalization and Professionalization, in THE 
HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION 487-98 (Michael L. Moffitt & Robert C. Bordone eds., 2005) 
(describing the various institution-driven requirements imposed on mediators in various contexts). 
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C. But Consent Often Makes Luck Invisible 
The foregoing analysis suggests that consent fixes luck problems by 
positioning the parties as decision-makers at various points in the process.  
Bad mediator?  Parties can find someone else or quit the mediation 
altogether.  Unfavorable proposal?  Parties can refuse to sign.  If lucky 
(unchosen) events affect the process and outcome, but the parties sign off 
anyway, one interpretation of the parties’ consent is that they intentionally 
merged these luck effects into the agreement because the effects were either 
beneficial or at least not on balance detrimental to the overall benefits. 
Another interpretation, of course, is that the consent itself may have 
been relatively meaningless in a process that mechanically gathers consents 
without regard to the luck distortions (constitutive, circumstantial, or 
otherwise) affecting the quality of those consents.  Social psychology and 
neuroscience, for example, recently have overwhelmed us with new models 
of human decision-making informed by cognitive biases, heuristics, 
schemas, reptilian brain functions, and a host of other non-conscious factors 
that throw into doubt any traditional understanding of agency and consent.144  
One need not fully embrace these findings to agree that the quality of 
consent is not constant but can shift and vary, depending on the people and 
circumstances involved. 
Either way, consent makes luck invisible by merging it into the 
agreement or by hiding it behind an ideological commitment to individual 
choice.  As a system matter, sublimating luck is unwise because it may make 
problem diagnosis and resolution more difficult in the aftermath of 
settlements.  Perhaps, this invisible luck is responsible in some part for the 
rise in broken agreements, for example.145  Or more broadly, perhaps 
 
 144. Jennifer Robbennolt and Jean Sternlight’s new book on legally relevant information from 
psychology brings together many of these literatures.  JENNIFER K. ROBBENNOLT & JEAN R. 
STERNLIGHT, PSYCHOLOGY FOR LAWYERS: UNDERSTANDING THE HUMAN FACTORS IN 
NEGOTIATION, LITIGATION, AND DECISIONMAKING (2012).  These materials overlap with Jon 
Hanson and the other critical realists; see, e.g., Jon Hanson, Introduction, in IDEOLOGY, 
PSYCHOLOGY, AND LAW 4-7 (Jon Hanson ed., 2012) (examining ideology as a cognitive constraint).  
The neuroscience angle is a more recent variation on the same theme of biased-and-unreliable-
awareness-masquerading-as-agency.  The fact that forced altruism has the same measurable effect on 
the brain as real altruism, for example, suggests that we may overvalue pure agency in settlement 
contexts.  See, e.g., Richard Birke, Neuroscience and Settlement: An Examination of Scientific 
Innovations and Practical Applications, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 477, 522-23 (2010)  (noting 
also that “people’s sense of what will make them feel good is not accurate” and therefore mediators 
should consider “pushing to the edge of ethics” in mediation). 
 145. “Frequently, the fatal flaw in agreements that ultimately unravel is the absence of authentic 
consent” even though “[t]he majority of parties who challenge the enforceability of mediated 
agreements are not successful.” Jacqueline Nolan-Haley, Consent in Mediation, 14 DISP. RESOL. 
MAG. 4, 4-5 (2007-2008). 
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invisible luck exacerbates many of the concerns about the legitimacy of 
institutionalized ADR, such as the potential for parties with unequal power 
to make decisions that could have an impact on non-present third parties, 
such as the public, in private settings bound by strong confidentiality and led 
by virtually unaccountable mediators.146 
Part of the trouble may come from the notion of consent itself.  The 
following section continues with the example of small claims mediation and 
argues that misunderstandings and multiple interpretations of “consent” may 
be primary sources of luckiness in ADR systems.  In mediation, these 
misunderstandings emerge as definitional and process ambiguities that 
together create a large luck gap—which, in turn, is shrouded by a strong 
simplistic view of consent. 
1. Definitional Ambiguities 
Like many legally meaningful terms, the word “consent” is not easy to 
define.  Before examining how consent mechanisms work in small claims 
dispute resolution settings, let us briefly examine what consent and informed 
consent mean. 
a.  Consent.  There are several ordinary yet different senses of 
“consent” that both reinforce and complicate one another.  Consider this 
standard definition of consent: “to permit, approve, or agree; to comply or 
yield.”147  “Permit” suggests that a consenting party may allow something to 
happen, even if she does not intend to do the something herself.  For 
example, at a neighborhood homeowners association meeting, a board 
member may consent to a proposed block party without necessarily 
committing to bringing a dish or even attending.  “Permit” captures this 
passive, yielding aspect of consent; it is a choice, but the choice is basically 
not to resist the proposed activity. 
Consent also means “to agree.”  Continuing with the block party 
example, by affirmatively saying yes to the block party, the consenting 
board member both approves the block party idea and perhaps implies that 
she plans on taking a more active role in the party.  Although it is true that 
she might use the words “I agree” without intending to participate, the word 
 
 146. Here the classic critiques of the field still resonate.  See sources cited supra note 16; see 
also Susskind, supra note 23, at 8 (insisting on the public interest as a necessary though often 
ignored part of environmental mediation). 
 147. Dictionary.com, Consent, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/consent?s=t 9 (last 
visited Aug. 11, 2013) (“to permit, approve, or agree; to comply or yield”). 
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“agree” is certainly stronger than “permit” and expresses more of the 
agentic, active dimensions of consent. 
Finally, consent also captures the sense of “comply.”  Depending on the 
wording of the resolution before the board, consenting may mean assuming 
responsibility for certain chores under the direction of the block party 
committee chair or other decision-maker.  Choosing to comply, on this view, 
relinquishes some portion of autonomy within some parameters for some 
period of time (e.g., “What am I going to do on the night of the block 
party?”) to someone else. 
The purpose of this brief lexicographical exercise is not to nail down a 
single definition of consent, but simply to point out that the word “consent” 
is semantically unstable and context dependent.  All of these popular 
synonyms for consent sound correct, yet none fit together easily.  Each 
resonates differently as to the levels of agency in decision-making, the 
overall commitment to agreement, the nature and quality of participation in 
implementation activities, and the assertion of personal autonomy.  To 
understand what the board member’s consent to the block party entailed, we 
would need more context, such as how the resolution was framed, what was 
said during the meeting, what the group’s default norms are, and what the 
board member’s own intentions were with respect to her consent in this 
instance.  For the present discussion, noting this possible confusion and 
context dependency may help explain why consent can be such a slippery 
legal and moral concept, particularly for non-lawyers and one-shot players in 
dispute resolution settings. 
b.  Informed consent.  Likewise, the separate but related doctrine of 
“informed consent” presents significant definitional challenges.  As 
described above, informed consent consists of information disclosure and, 
after the competent recipient of such disclosure such disclosure is 
understands and appreciates it , voluntary consent. 
This definition seems straightforward enough; but for scholars and 
practitioners (and, especially, for people who are themselves about to make 
an important choice), informed consent is an elusive doctrine that 
continually challenges our understanding of what it means to sufficiently 
prepare someone to make decisions.  What to disclose, how to disclose it, 
how much understanding is required, whether understanding has occurred, 
and how capably certain parties can exercise autonomy within particular 
contexts are not settled questions.148  People facing difficult time-sensitive 
 
 148. See, e.g., Informed Consent, supra note 118, at 781-87 (defining informed consent in 
professional contexts and noting the problems associated with determining the proper disclosures in 
these contexts); see also Clark Freshman, Tweaking the Market for Autonomy: A Problem-Solving 
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decisions about their health or their legal situation may have trouble 
understanding their options when evaluating unfamiliar choices in settings 
apart from their everyday reality.149  What’s more, in these atypical settings, 
people may not be able to appreciate the possible or likely consequences of 
their choices, particularly when confronted with the presence and advice of 
those recognized as professionals.150 
Accordingly, scholars and practitioners working on informed consent 
issues are concerned not only about the wording of disclaimers or the right 
methods for assessing competency but also about theories of the self, 
socially constructed roles and ideologies, and strategies of power and 
resistance.  The more destabilized and contingent the individual’s identity is, 
the more problematic the idea of “freely made choices” becomes; and this is 
true for everyone, not just for those in historically marginalized or exploited 
groups.  As biomedical ethicist Carolyn Ells writes, “informed choice must 
be understood in explicitly relationship terms that includes social 
relationships.  It is a decision or authorization situated in a set of 
practices,”151 not simply the delivery of a premeasured dose of information 
to an individual who then rationally processes the data and decides. 
 
Perspective to Informed Consent in Arbitration, 56 U. MIAMI L. REV. 909, 911-12 (2002) (defining 
autonomy in terms of the exercise of informed consent). 
 149. In bioethics, for example, the “therapeutic misconception” refers to the mistake patients 
make when they believe that participating in a research study will provide them with therapeutic 
benefits, even when they are told beforehand that no such therapeutic benefits will occur.  Charles 
Lidz notes that a “strong model” of informed consent in these situations is not empirically defensible 
because it does not take into account the tendency for patients to confuse research and treatment 
frames.  Charles W. Lidz, The Therapeutic Misconception and Our Models of Competency and 
Informed Consent, 24 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 535, 538 (2006).  Together with Hensler’s observations 
about court-connected mediation, supra note 89, Lidz’s analysis suggests some provocative analogs 
with unrepresented parties in small claims mediation.  Those who come into the courthouse may 
believe that their dispute will be adjudicated by someone in authority according to legal norms, 
despite what they are told about alternative processes, roles, and responsibilities. 
 150. See, e.g., Carolyn Ells, Foucault, Feminism, and Informed Choice, 24 J. OF MED. HUMAN. 
213, 214-16 (2003) (mapping Foucauldian power structures in terms of institutions and bodies).  
Contracts scholars have produced an important and voluminous literature on the inadequacy of 
consent and informed consent devices in adhesion contracts such as consumer agreements.  See, e.g., 
Amy J. Schmitz, Pizza-Box Contracts: True Tales of Consumer Contracting Culture, 45 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 863, 879-87 (2010) (providing data showing that consumers do not read contract 
terms); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, A License To Deceive: Enforcing Contractual 
Myths Despite Consumer Psychological Realities, 5 N.Y.U. J.L.  & BUS. 617, 617 (2009) (arguing 
that consumers tend to trust salespeople and real estate brokers and other professionals involved in 
the transaction, even if the statements of those people are absent from or even contradictory to 
provisions in the sales agreement). 
 151. Ells, supra note 151, at 224. 
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In this way, informed consent is another turn on the “permit, agree, 
comply” construct.  Informed consent in its strongest form sounds most like 
agree, in that the strong form presumes a high level of agency and 
endorsement based on full information about the proposed course forward as 
well as an understanding of one’s own interests, preferences, resources, and 
so on.  A weaker form of informed consent might emerge when a person 
bases her decision more on the person making the proposal than on the 
merits of the proposal itself: permit, suggests non-resistance to what 
someone else wants to do, and although this does not sound ideal such 
“permission” is nonetheless a common manifestation of informed consent, 
perhaps particularly in the health arena. Faced with a time sensitive health 
decision, for example, a person’s informed consent may not be with full 
understanding and appreciation but instead just reflect the delegation of 
decision making to the perceived expert.  “Comply” is even weaker, in that 
comply, suggests that the person will follow the instructions of another.  We 
know that this weak form of informed consent still counts as consent: “I was 
following orders” does not translate, as a legal matter, to “I did not 
consent.”152 
Consent and informed consent, therefore, are fraught terms that 
continually deconstruct themselves, in that they presuppose both an ideal of 
rational presence and an actual human decision that is necessarily contingent 
on numerous factors beyond the control or knowledge of the decision-maker.  
The ideal/reality clash in consent appears in multiple scholarly literatures, 
and is an intractable problem.153  For scholars studying consensual 
procedural law, both of these dimensions of consent—on the one hand the 
ideals of autonomy and self-determination, on the other the recognition that 
individuals are more complicated than the rational choice model154 might 
 
 152. Indeed, this submissive aspect of consent creates problems for those who seek to valorize 
the individual and neoliberal policies here and abroad.  See, e.g., Robin West, Authority Autonomy 
and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard 
Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384, 426 (1985) (observing that consent “may spring from fear, hysteria, 
feelings of inadequacy, or masochistic compulsion” and therefore does not necessarily express 
autonomy or maximize utility). 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id.; see also Ran Kuttner, The Wave/Particle Tension in Negotiation, 16 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 331, 332 (2011) (arguing that the negotiation process is better understood as an “emergent 
system” that extends beyond static, discrete interests and individual personalities); Kenneth H. Fox, 
Negotiation as a Postmodern Process, in RETHINKING NEGOTIATION TEACHING: INNOVATIONS FOR 
CONTEXT AND CULTURE 20-23 (Christopher Honeyman et al. eds., 2009) (contrasting the 
“individualist and rational” model of negotiation with an “emergent and dynamic” enterprise in 
which parties “‘co-create’ meaning”).  But see Amy J. Cohen, Negotiation, Meet New Governance: 
Interests, Skills, and Selves, 33 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 503, 523 (2008) (arguing that most modern 
negotiation scholars still “believe in the possibility, along with the value, of making individuals into 
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suggest and so procuring their informed consent may not be as easy as it 
looks—present intriguing practical challenges for determining how to 
preserve and express consent in mediation. 
2. Process Ambiguities 
Compounding these definitional ambiguities are process ambiguities 
with respect to mediation.  Small claims mediation again provides a useful 
example.  In general, first timers will not know how mediation works, either 
as a standalone process or as a court-connected option.  This process 
ignorance could create excessive luck effects, because the party is unable to 
engage as autonomously as she would otherwise be able to.  The cure for 
this ignorance is consent, which happens at numerous points throughout the 
mediation process.  Consent, on this view, provides participants an 
opportunity to learn what is happening and contribute to the process and 
outcome.  In this way, consent resists luck. 
Yet that view presupposes that participants are equipped with consent in 
a way that empowers them to engage the process.  Given that small claims 
mediation may be an unfamiliar process, sound mediation practice 
prescribes numerous consent points throughout the process, to provide 
participants with opportunities to learn and shape the resolution of their own 
dispute.  These same consent points, however, are also fault lines in that they 
create ambiguities around what is happening. 
To illustrate, recall the description above of the three major consent 
points in the mediation process: early, during, and at the end. 
Early pre-mediation consent points are important, because they are the 
first opportunities for the disputants to exercise self-determination in the 
process.  As such, the kinds of information that disputants receive at these 
early choice points may influence not only whether they consent to 
participate in mediation, but also what they think consent means later.  For 
example, consider the differences between these descriptions of mediation 
from different small claims courts’ webpages: 
1.  When the defendant in a small claims case responds within 14 days after being served 
with the claim, the court will set a hearing date and notify the parties of that date by mail.  
On the scheduled court date the parties will be referred to a mediator to assist the parties 
to attempt to settle their case.  If the parties reach an agreement, the agreement is 
 
[rationally acting] self-managers: purpose, self-reflexive, and able to think clearly and act creatively 
in conditions of uncertainty”). 
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presented to the judge for approval.  If the parties are unable to reach an agreement, a 
judge hears the case after the mediation session.155  (Oregon) 
2.  Mediation allows you to make choices about what you feel is in your best interest.  It 
is a way of helping people reach settlement.  You and the other party make the decisions 
in mediation.  You are under no obligation to reach an agreement, and you do not give up 
your right to a court hearing.156 (Maine) 
3.  Nebraska has six (6) court-approved mediation centers located throughout the state to 
assist individuals with settling disputes outside the court system.  If you would like to try 
mediation in your small claims case, contact a center near you.157 (Nebraska) 
4.  Contested small claims may be ordered to mediation.  This is a process involving the 
plaintiff, defendant, and a trained mediator.  During mediation, the mediator will attempt 
to resolve the dispute between the parties.158 (Hawai’i) 
5.  Mediation is available in many courts on the date of trial.  When the case is called, if 
mediation is available you will be asked if you would like to mediate your claim.159  
(Massachusetts) 
For the person unfamiliar with mediation or small claims court, these 
five descriptions might leave fairly different impressions.  The Maine 
excerpt expresses the most faithful recitation of traditional mediation 
principles, emphasizing the control of the parties and the need for consent 
throughout.  The mediator does not show up in this description at all; Maine 
makes mediation sound like a comfortable room in which the parties can try 
to sort out their differences.  The Hawai’i excerpt, in contrast, recasts 
mediation into litigation speak (e.g., starting with “contested small claims 
may be ordered”) and positions the mediator as decisionmaker in the 
dispute.  The use of “attempts” in “attempts to resolve” perhaps blunts the 
mediator’s authority somewhat, though it is a fairly subtle hedge.  The 
Oregon excerpt falls between these poles, closer to the Maine example, in 
that it stresses party control but is still somewhat similar to Hawai’i in that 
Oregon presents mediation as one step in a formal litigation process.  This is 
not inaccurate, but it does paint mediation with the litigation brush, which 
 
 155. Lane County Circuit Court, Mediation/Arbitration, available at 
http://courts.oregon.gov/Lane/Mediation/MediationPage.page?#SmClm (last visited Aug. 11, 2013). 
 156. State of Maine Judicial Branch, Guide to Small Claims Proceedings in the District Court 
http://www.courts.state.me.us/maine_courts/small_claims/smallclaimsguide/going_to_court.html 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2013). 
 157. State of Nebraska Judicial Branch, Filing a Small Claims Case in Nebraska, available at 
http://www.supremecourt.ne.gov/self-help/7224/filing-small-claims-case-nebraska (last visited Aug. 
11, 2013). 
 158. The Judiciary State of Hawai’i District Court of the First Circuit, Your Guide to Small 
Claims Court, available at 
http://www.courts.state.hi.us/docs/self_help_docs/small_claims_brochure.pdf (last visited Aug. 11, 
2013). 
 159. The Massachusetts Court System, Small Claims Information, available at 
http://www.mass.gov/courts/courtsandjudges/courts/districtcourt/smallclaims.html#16 (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2013). 
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could give the parties the impression that  mediation only addresses those 
matters of interest to litigation, thus impinging upon their self-determination 
in the broader dispute context. 
Finally, we have Nebraska and Boston, both of which take a terse, 
hands-off approach to informing disputants about mediation via the website.  
Nebraska and Boston might think disputants already know what mediation 
is; possibly they do not want to commit themselves to a particular definition 
of mediation.  Whatever the reason, the impression left is that Nebraska 
appears not to have court-connected small claims mediation at all while 
Massachusetts does seem to have court-connected small claims mediation, 
but only in limited quantities.  For disputants in these two regions, the 
message seems to be if you want mediation, you must proactively seek it 
out.  On the one hand, that message does not answer the question of what 
mediation is and further might delegitimize mediation as a high quality 
alternative to litigation because, especially in the case of Nebraska, it sounds 
like mediation does not take place in what first timers might recognize as the 
legal system.  On the other hand, pushing disputants to recognize mediation 
as a choice that they need to make could encourage less passive responses to 
mediation and promote autonomy and self-determination. 
Of course, there are limitations to this kind of textual comparison and 
analysis, considering that the disputants arguably should research their 
options more thoroughly than glancing through a website before going to 
court.  In addition, depending on how the small claims court structures its 
intake processes and information desk, disputants may receive more 
information and counseling in person when they arrive at the courthouse, 
and those services are not captured in this comparison.160  Even so, the 
differences here demonstrate some of the potential variations that could have 
an impact on how a person enters mediation—whether confused, 
,submissive, or empowered—and that entry stance may affect subsequent 
consents in mediation. . 
For example, once the mediation starts, participation consent may be the 
manifestation of active agreement, the byproduct of a misunderstanding of 
what the process is all about, process inertia, or deal fatigue.  Participation 
consent in joint session is not the same as in caucus, because they involve 
 
 160. E.g., of the thirty-six county courts in Oregon, almost all have information about small 
claims mediation on their websites and more than half offer additional information through the mail 
and at the courthouse, including flyers, brochures, pre-mediation videos, and assigning someone to 
answer questions that small claims participants might have. 
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different inputs: a mediator may prefer caucuses, for example, because the 
parties are more agreeable (i.e., consenting)..  Additionally, once a proposal 
is on the table, outcome consent could be the manifestation of active 
agreement, process inertia, or deal fatigue.  It is hard to know whether 
people are actually satisfied with the result, because people tend to report 
how they think they are supposed to feel (especially considering that they 
themselves agreed—a sort of resistance to cognitive dissonance). 
3. How These Definitional and Process Ambiguities Hide Luck 
Ms. P is a competent and educated member of the middle class.  She 
asked for mediation in a small claims case.  She participated voluntarily in 
the entire mediation process; she did not ask to leave, and she willingly 
cooperated with each of M’s process proposals throughout.  Finally, Ms. P 
agreed to the settlement, even contributing an interest of her own.  Ms. P’s 
consent is clear from her behavior throughout the process, culminating with 
signing the final agreement and then complying with the terms.  As 
mentioned before, focusing on these multiple consents throughout the 
mediation supports the conclusion that the mediation process and outcome 
were not lucky, but were instead expressions of tailor-made, individual-
driven justice. 
Another interpretation of these events, taking into account the 
definitional and process ambiguities around consent as described above, 
might go as follows: like many Americans, Ms. P has no formal training in 
or exposure to the legal system or institutionalized ADR.  She therefore had 
no idea what to expect either from mediation or small claims court, other 
than the impressions she had cobbled together (non-informed consent).  
When she arrived at her hearing, she thought a mediator sounded better than 
a judge and that mediation sounded better than a hearing (non-informed 
consent).  Once in mediation, she followed M’s directions, which makes 
sense since as a first-timer she did not have any process alternatives to offer 
(consent as permission).  When M said, “Q has a good case,” which could 
have been a throwaway remark that M says to everyone to encourage 
settlement, Ms. P concluded that she should give Q what he was demanding 
(consent as compliance).  Asking for Q to pick up the door was almost an 
afterthought, and happened so close to the end of the process that Ms. P did 
not have time to reconsider that request more carefully.  This alternative 
reading of events, therefore, suggests that the quality of Ms. P’s consent 
varied throughout the day, and furthermore, that this variable quality was 
linked to both constitutive and circumstantial luck (Ms. P’s unfamiliarity 
with the process, Ms. P’s aversion to court, and the assignment of M). 
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Actually, asking Q to pick up the door may have been one of Ms. P’s 
purest moments of agency in the entire mediation.  Although her request did 
not take into account the potential offset available for returning the door (an 
offset that a judge undoubtedly would have made), the quick identification 
of her interest (getting rid of the door), along with the awareness that the 
proposal was soon to be finalized, could suggest that an incipient consent 
consciousness may have been in the making. 
This glimmer of agency is important, even if it comes by way of 
unfairly enriching Q, because it reminds us that consent can improve.  The 
democratic promise of alternative practices is leveraging genuine self-
determination in support of individual and community decisions.  Weak or 
non-existent consent, therefore, will not work for ADR systems.  Given the 
process pluralism and diversity of outcomes supported by alternative 
practice, ADR needs consent to be a fairly stable, relatively strong category.  
Only then will consent be able to mitigate luck distortions and other 
detriments more consistently and with greater faithfulness to the parties’ 
self-determination.  The next part explores the challenge of cultivating 
consent so that participants in mediation and other alternative processes are 
operating at a high level of engagement. 
IV. HOW TO MAKE CONSENT-BASED PROCESSES LESS LUCKY 
The garage door mediation highlights the shortcomings of consent in 
alternative settings.  Consent is supposed to mitigate luck distortions that 
invariably arise in overdetermined human contexts.  On this view, consent 
buffers luck and preserves the opportunity for justice.  Yet, as argued above, 
consented-to outcomes can be unjust because consent is a fraught category 
that continually deconstructs itself, as a matter of definition and practice, and 
is thus susceptible to the luck distortions that pervade ADR processes.  
Because consent is the exercise of human agency in the world, it is 
necessarily subject to the vagaries of extrinsic (external conditions) and 
intrinsic (cognitive predilections) luck.  A system that leans too heavily on 
consent, therefore, may undervalue these unconsented-to inputs and thereby 
develop serious justice concerns.  Such is the case with unrepresented 
dispute resolution, such as small claims mediation (or adhesive arbitration or 
large-scale public sector decision-making and dispute resolution), in which 
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participants may consent to outcomes that do not meet the requisite standard 
for justice.161 
Given that party consent is not enough to ensure just outcomes, is it 
possible to improve consent in ADR processes?162  ADR scholars have 
addressed this issue by suggesting measures that fall into two broad 
overlapping categories.  One set of ideas focuses on improving the mediator.  
Scholars in this school of thought recommend changes that would make 
mediation more professional and accountable while attempting to preserve 
the flexibility and innovation that have historically characterized the field.  
The second set of ideas seeks to improve the context in which mediation 
takes place.  Scholars in this second school of thought suggest that court-
connected processes in particular would benefit from certain design changes, 
such as better disclosures at different points in the mediation, more 
appropriate defaults in legal regimes, and cooling-off periods for mediated 
agreements.  These design innovations are meant to make consent more 
meaningful by avoiding luck effects associated with the relevant legal 
framework, unfamiliarity with mediation and other alternative processes, or 
with time pressures. 
This part reviews those ideas and suggests another category for 
innovation: improving the consent competency unrepresented disputants.  It 
is not enough to have a beautifully tailored process hosted by an impeccably 
trained and licensed mediator.  The people who come unrepresented into 
dispute resolution settings must have a certain level of proficiency with their 
consent.  They have to know what it means to give consent and how an 
unfamiliar and stressful setting could jeopardize their full participation in the 
process.  Without this consent competency, the potential of alternative 
processes cannot be achieved. 
A. Improving the Mediator 
From the perspective of system design, it is obvious that the mediator is 
a critical variable.  This is true even though the parties are supposed to be 
 
 161. See Susskind, supra note 23, at 14 (arguing that complex mediations must strive for not 
only sound process but objectively fair results). 
 162. Of course, taken to their philosophical limits, genuine free will and fully self-actualized 
consent are impossible to attain and therefore hopelessly unworkable as system variables.  So it is 
tempting to throw in the towel and either live with the fictions of consent as presently configured in 
modern legal institutions or choose nihilism.  With that in mind, this part strategically assumes that 
true consent is an achievable goal and that justice benefits may redound from attempting to reach 
that goal.  This is a strategic assumption because it is not meant to satisfy the theoretical conundrum, 
but rather address the practical challenge of making access to justice more real for unrepresented 
disputants. 
50
Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal, Vol. 14, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/drlj/vol14/iss2/4
[Vol. 14: 245, 2014]  
PEPPERDINE DISPUTE RESOLUTION LAW JOURNAL 
295 
the primary movers in mediation, through the device of consent.  Mediators 
are prominent sites of system diagnosis and suggested improvements for 
three reasons. 
One, no one doubts that the mediator’s special role as process guide 
(and sometimes evaluator) influences the parties to some degree.163  Party 
perceptions of procedural justice, for example, will be affected by how the 
mediator speaks to the parties and structures a process that enables (or does 
not) respect and participation.164  These perceptions in turn will inform 
whether the parties believe that the outcomes are fair, regardless of the 
actual quality of the outcomes themselves.  Beyond procedural justice 
concerns, the mediator’s choices around process will have an impact on who 
gets to say what, when, and in whose presence.  Sequencing the dialogue 
and possibly sequestering the parties has an impact on how the parties 
ultimately decide to resolve their dispute.165  In this way, process 
organization is not only relevant to decision-making, it is at the heart of 
decision-making.166  As such, the process control of the mediator is an 
important system element. 
Two, because of the flexibility and informality that is traditionally 
associated with mediation, process, and outcomes are not consistent or 
predictable.  This is true insofar as both process and outcomes reflect the 
interests and resources of the individual disputants.  As noted previously, 
 
 163. See Dirty Little Secret, supra note 17, at 5 (listing ways that mediators influence parties, 
from control over the seating arrangement to encouraging doubts); see also Hensler, supra note 89, 
at 96 (“Anecdotal evidence suggests that in order to persuade parties to accept a settlement many 
mediators paint trials in the most negative light possible.”); John Lande, Using Dispute System 
Design Methods To Promote Good-Faith Participation in Court-Connected Mediation Programs, 50 
UCLA L. REV. 69, 106 (2002) (arguing that a good-faith requirement “gives mediators too much 
authority over participants to direct the outcome in mediation”). 
 164. See, e.g., Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff & Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice and the Rule of 
Law: Fostering Legitimacy in Alternative Dispute Resolution, 2011 J. DISP. RESOL. 1 (2011) 
(applying psychological insights from procedural justice studies to alternative processes); see also 
Nancy A. Welsh, Disputants’ Decision Control in Court-Connected Mediation: A Hollow Promise 
Without Procedural Justice, 2002 J. DISP. RESOL. 179 (2002) (arguing for explicit procedural justice 
in all consensual processes and especially in mediation). 
 165. See, e.g., Richard M. Calkins, Caucus Mediation—Putting Conciliation Back into the 
Process: The Peacemaking Approach to Resolution, Peace, and Healing, 54 DRAKE L. REV. 259, 
273 (2006) (arguing that keeping parties apart in mediation can be “kinder [and] more user-friendly” 
than having them together in joint session). 
 166. See, e.g., Frank E. A. Sander & Lukasz Rozdeiczer, Selecting an Appropriate Dispute 
Resolution Procedure: Detailed Analysis and Simplified Solution, in THE HANDBOOK OF DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION (Robert C. Bordone & Michael L. Moffitt eds., 2005) (explaining how process choices 
affect and are affected by party goals and features of the dispute). 
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one of the great advantages of less rigid processes like mediation is that they 
allow for creative, outside-the-box resolutions to disputes.  The system 
designer must determine, hopefully along with input from participants, when 
these variances are welcome innovations. 
Three, because of the strong legal protections afforded to mediation by 
way of confidentiality rules and freedom of contract, mediators are generally 
not legally accountable for their performance.167  Most states have broad 
confidentiality rules around mediation that make it difficult for parties to talk 
about what happened in mediation.168  Additionally, mediation historically 
has been an unregulated profession not requiring particular degrees, state 
licensure, or other professional credentials.169  Such anti-credentialism is 
very much in keeping with the modern origins of mediation, which sited the 
process in community centers and characterized the process as informal and 
not beholden to institutional norms and requirements.170  The combination of 
no legal accountability and no state regulation creates a “black box” around 
the mediator that, at least for system designers, is problematic given 
reasonable demands on the legal system to deliver just outcomes. 
The problem with unaccountable mediators can reach scandalous 
proportions.  Everyone has heard about the bad mediator who, by virtue of 
being part of an unregulated profession, that in most states enjoys strong 
confidentiality protections, runs roughshod over participants and makes a 
mess of the process and the result.  In a recent presentation, for example, Art 
Hinshaw described a mediator in Arizona who preyed upon unhappy women 
who came to him seeking divorce mediation services.  Not only did this 
mediator start up dead end romantic relationships with these women while 
they were parties in mediation, but he also flagrantly overcharged them.171 
 
 167. See Moffitt, supra note 20. 
 168. But see Cole, supra note 78, at 1421 (arguing that lawyers routinely break mediation 
confidentiality and that courts look the other way). 
 169. See, e.g., Sean F. Nolon, Second Best Practices?: Addressing Mediation’s Definitional 
Problems in Environmental Siting Disputes, 49 IDAHO L. REV. 69, 70 (2012) (providing case studies 
showing how calling those who mediate environmental siting disputes “mediators” actually can 
complicate resolution and compromise the public’s understanding of mediation generally). 
 170. Of course, many courts require their mediators to have certain qualifications before 
allowing them to work as mediators in court-connected contexts.  Additionally, as mentioned earlier, 
organizations such as JAMS have developed to help participants and lawyers sort through mediators 
since no state credentialing is available.  Yet with all this in mind, as Professor Susskind has pointed 
out, credentials might not be helpful in certain mediation settings, such as large and contentious 
public disputes.  In those cases, appointing a mediator with name-recognition or other authority 
would make a positive difference.  See Susskind, supra note 23, at 35 (“Almost all the participants 
felt that [Congressman Tim] Wirth’s clout was a key ingredient in achieving the settlement that was 
obtained.”). 
 171. See Art Hinshaw, Regulating the Rogue Mediator, Presentation at the 2012 AALS ADR 
Section Works-in-Progress Conference (Nov. 8, 2012) (slides on file with the author).  Professor 
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Given the importance of the mediator (whether rogue or well-
intentioned) in mediation, an enormous literature has developed around 
making mediators more effective.  Some of this scholarship examines how 
new mediators are trained;172 some assesses existing approaches to 
mediation and often proposes new ones;173 and some focuses on regulating 
mediation more closely.174  The Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 
for example, articulates “fundamental ethical guidelines for persons 
mediating in all practice contexts” that set baseline norms for the practice.175  
These model standards along with the rest of these improve-the-mediator 
ideas may be thought to benefit consent-based processes by making 
mediators as process guides more skilled at and accountable for tailoring the 
process more closely to the parties’ priorities, thereby lessening the 
likelihood that luck will influence the mediation outcome. 
Yet, these improvements do not necessarily strengthen party consent.  
Improve-the-mediator ideas generally do not address⎯and indeed may 
create⎯the luck problem related to the proliferation of available alternative 
processes.176  It may be that a sound regulation scheme, for example, might 
deem the major mediation approaches (facilitative, evaluative, 
transformative, narrative) as license-worthy.  In court settings, however, 
most mediations may be primarily about facts and legal issues.177  In this 
kind of situation, especially if parties are not represented, having a variety of 
 
Hinshaw recently told me that the mediator in question, Gary Karpin, may have ended up marrying 
one of his former clients.  It is hard to decide, however, whether that improves his professional 
record as a mediator.  Telephone Interview with Art Hinshaw, Clinical Professor of Law, Sandra 
Day O’Connor College of Law at Arizona State University (Aug. 7, 2013). 
 172. See, e.g., Raines et al., supra note 142; see also Paula M. Young, Teaching Professional 
Ethics to Lawyers and Mediators Using Active Learning Techniques, 40 SW. L. REV. 127 (2010). 
 173. Recent examples focus on the question of mediator neutrality and activism.  See, e.g., 
BERNARD MAYER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY: CONFRONTING THE CRISIS IN CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
(2004); Christopher Harper, Mediator as Peacemaker: The Case for Activist Transformative-
Narrative Mediation, 2006 J. DISP. RESOL. 595 (2006); Gary Paquin & Linda Harvey, Therapeutic 
Jurisprudence, Transformative Mediation and Narrative Mediation: A Natural Connection, 3 FLA. 
COASTAL L.J. 167 (2002). 
 174. See generally Joseph “Josh” B. Stulberg et al., Creating and Certifying the Professional 
Mediator-Education and Credentialing, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 75 (2004); but see Michael L. 
Moffitt, The Four Ways To Assure Mediator Quality (and Why None of Them Work), 24 OHIO ST. J. 
ON DISP. RESOL. 191 (2009). 
 175. Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, supra note 83, Preamble. 
 176. Frank Sander’s admonition that “the topic [of consent in mediation] probably deserves 
greater emphasis than has been the case in most [mediator] training programs” gets at this problem 
but does not lay out a vision for what such emphasis would look like.  Sander, supra note 130, at 10. 
 177. See Hensler, supra note 89, at 96. 
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trained and/or licensed mediators offering different approaches to the same 
types of fact and law-based problems could create a justice concern.178  
Hensler suggests that one answer may be to standardize the process that 
court-connected mediators use, which would improve consistency, but 
would run the risk of putting disputants into cookie cutters and expecting 
them to fit the mold given.179 
One answer might be that a truly “improved” mediator spends time 
acquainting the parties with her approach and seeking input on party 
interests and process before launching into the mediation.180  These kinds of 
disclosures are important but may be difficult to comprehend fully, 
depending on the participants’ level of process sophistication and 
engagement.181  And for the low-end justice market or the large-scale public 
sector arena, this kind of conversation may happen too close in time to the 
actual dispute resolution or decision-making to mitigate luck problems 
effectively.182 
B. Improving the Context 
Related to mediator improvements are improve-the-context ideas, which 
aim to improve the quality of consent by addressing three lucky aspects of 
alternative contexts: nonstandard processes and norms across contexts, 
variable information about the particular process at hand, and time pressures.  
The first-time small claims mediation participant, for example, likely does 
 
 178. See, e.g., Search for Justice, supra note 6, at 87 (noting that “[c]ourt mediation without 
knowledge of legal rights has the capacity to confuse, coerce, and mislead unrepresented parties”). 
 179. See Hensler, supra note 89, at 96-97; see Riskin & Welsh, supra note 75. 
 180. See, e.g., Tanya M. Marcum et al., Reframing the Mediation Lens: The Call for a 
Situational Style of Mediation, 36 S. Ill. U. L.J. 317, 334 (2012) (recommending that mediators 
adjust their style to meet the “demands of the situational context”). 
 181. Even an educated and/or otherwise engaged person may not be able to understand a new 
process (the incentives, the pitfalls, the applicability, etc.) that is laid out right before the person goes 
through that process.  Studies on informed consent in the medical context suggest that retention is 
greatly improved when the information is provided well in advance.  See, e.g., Suellen Miller et al., 
How To Make Consent Informed: Possible Lessons from Tibet, IRB ETHICS & HUMAN RESEARCH, 
Nov.–Dec. 2007, at 7 (recounting study showing that comprehension improved from 20% to 80% 
when the information was provided seven to ten days in advance, instead of right before the 
comprehension assessment was taken); see also Mary Cipriano Silva & Jeanne Merkle Sorrell, 
Enhancing Comprehension of Information for Informed Consent: A Review of Empirical Research, 
10 IRB 1, 3 (1988) (“Researchers suggest that a beneficial method of presentation of information for 
informed consent may be to provide time for patients to study the information before signing the 
informed consent document.”). 
 182. See, e.g., Patrick Field, Informed Consent in Public Sector Dispute Resolution, DISP. 
RESOL. MAG., Winter 2008, at 16, 18 (describing the importance of an “education period at the start 
of the process” when working with multiple stakeholders). 
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not know what to expect from mediation, yet is expected to know whether 
she wants to participate (unless she is ordered into mediation by the judge), 
whether it makes sense to continue with the process, and ultimately whether 
the proposed settlement is acceptable.  As noted earlier, these consent points 
throughout the process make the resultant agreement ⎯even if substantively 
unjust⎯difficult to unwind, regardless of whether the consents themselves 
were low quality. 
The major problem is non-standard processes across contexts, court-
connected and otherwise.  From the unrepresented small claims mediation 
participant to the community member receiving a flyer about an upcoming 
town hall on the topic of environmental remediation, lack of knowledge 
about what the process entails, what the participants’ rights and 
responsibilities are, how the process will unfold, and where the decision 
points will make consent less meaningful for those participants.183  In fact, 
without foreknowledge of how the process works, participants are likely to 
rely on what they perceive as the background rules for the sponsoring 
institution.  In the case of small claims mediation, for example, 
unrepresented first-time participants may assume that they would hear about 
any legal entitlements they have and that other parties cannot misrepresent 
the law or their chances of winning in court.184  These would be incorrect 
assumptions that may form the basis of a consented-to agreement and thus 
present an example of luck impinging on justice. 
To address this problem more globally, policymakers have promulgated 
the Uniform Mediation Act185 and the Mediator Model Standards of 
Conduct, as discussed earlier.  Both were intended to provide more 
regularity to the process regardless of context.  Other sources of global 
process guidance come from professional organizations, law schools, and 
industry resources.  These sources are intended, at least in part, to make 
process more predictable and easier to understand. 
Additionally, in more local contexts, some jurisdictions carefully 
manage their process pieces around mediation.  Courts not only create rules 
around who can mediate and maintain rosters of eligible mediators, but also 
sometimes specify what ethical standards and guiding principles should 
 
 183. Id. 
 184. See sources cited supra Part III.C. 
 185. National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform Laws, Uniform Mediation Act (Aug. 
2001), available at http://www.mediate.com/articles/umafinalstyled.cfm.  The act was adopted by 
the ABA House of Delegates in February 2002.  Marcia S. Cohen, The Mediation Privilege, 87 FLA. 
B.J. 14, 19 n.6 (2013). 
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govern court-connected mediation.  In Florida and Minnesota, the courts 
wrote guidelines that declare the importance of self-determination in the 
mediation process.186  Similarly, in Oregon and likely elsewhere, judges as a 
matter of course will deliver verbal instructions to small claims mediation 
participants to provide some broad contours around substantive entitlements 
as well as acceptable process and conduct.  Nolan-Haley’s recommendation 
that, in the absence of legal representation, mediators be empowered and 
expected to provide legal information—at a minimum, to say that the 
participants’ legal rights may be at stake—is another example of a context 
improvement.187  Nolan-Haley indexes this responsibility to a sliding scale 
with three weights: voluntariness of the mediation (freely chosen or 
mandated); location (outside of court or in courthouse); and representation 
(having a lawyer or not).188  Ultimately, Nolan-Haley’s context 
recommendation that mediators should provide legal information strives to 
improve the quality of consent by making that consent more informed. 
Other context improvements focus on the legal regime surrounding 
mediation and the mediation agreement.189  As previously stated, mediators 
are relatively insulated from charges of misconduct, and mediated 
agreements are difficult to unwind.  Scholars have suggested improvements 
to the relevant legal context that work to protect consent by limiting the 
damage that unrepresented, or even represented, parties can inflict upon 
themselves.  Adjustments to particular legal doctrines could allow parties to 
exercise greater self-determination after the fact; for many parties, 
unfortunately, it is only after the fact that they realize they may have 
consented to something unfair. 
For example, Nancy Welsh has called for reweighing the defaults on a 
number of contract defenses190 and providing a non-waivable “cooling-off 
period” for mediated agreements that would give parties three days to think 
 
 186. See Thinning Vision, supra note 116, at 57-58. 
 187. See Informed Consent, supra note 118, at 825-26.  But see Michael T. Colatrella, Informed 
Consent in Mediation: Promoting Pro Se Parties’ Informed Settlement Choice While Honoring the 
Mediator’s Ethical Duties, 15 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 705, 707 (2014) (arguing that 
“[i]mposing the duty of informed outcome consent on the mediator would create a significant 
conflict with the mediator’s ethical obligations”). 
 188. Id. at 827. 
 189. See, e.g., Elad Finkelstein & Shahar Lifshitz, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Mediator: A 
Communitarian Theory of Post-Mediation Contracts, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 667 (2010) 
(arguing that public regulation of mediation procedure, process, and contract is necessary to preserve 
access to justice); John Lande, Principles for Policymaking About Collaborative Law and Other 
ADR Processes, 22 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 619 (2007) (suggesting ways to improve ADR that 
will meet social needs in the future, including potential regulations and practices to prevent coercion 
and ensure voluntariness). 
 190. See Thinning Vision, supra note 116, at 78-86. 
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about and possibly modify their agreement before it goes into effect.191  Such 
an improvement would both strengthen consent—by ensuring that the 
resultant agreement is, indeed, something everyone agrees to—and, 
somewhat paradoxically, limit consent.192 
Another example of a context improvement meant to protect parties 
from themselves is the so-called “czar/czarina provisions” in settlement 
agreements that empower judges to settle interpretation disputes during the 
drafting process and during post-agreement implementation.193  Czar/czarina 
provisions invest judges with settlement enforcement jurisdiction, and must 
appear in the agreement.194  The totalitarian spirit of such provisions is 
evident from the following 1995 declaration by an Oregon federal judge: 
I will act as czar with regard to the drafting of the settlement papers and the construction 
of this settlement and the execution of this settlement.  And that means that if there is any 
dispute that is brought to me by counsel, I will decide the matter according to 
proceedings which I designate in the manner that I designate, and that decision will be 
final without any opportunity to appeal.195 
 
 191. Id. at 87. 
 192. Professor Welsh explains: 
By far, however, the most significant objection to the imposition of a cooling-off period 
is that it would permit parties to back out of agreements much more easily, possibly 
based only on buyers’ or sellers’ remorse. . . . This concern squarely raises the challenge 
of “walking the talk” of self-determination.  If self-determination—not settlement—is the 
fundamental principle underlying mediation, the benefits provided by this cooling off 
proposal clearly outweigh the possible risks. 
Id. at 91. 
 193. I first heard of czar/czarina provisions from Chief Judge Ann Aiken of the District of 
Oregon.  Judge Aiken notes that the provisions have been used in the District since the late 1980s.  
Email from Ann Aiken, Chief Judge of the District of Oregon, to Jen Reynolds, Assistant Professor 
of Law, University of Oregon School of Law (Aug. 10, 2013).  For more on judges as settlement 
czars, see generally Morton Denlow, Federal Jurisdiction in the Enforcement of Settlement 
Agreements: Kokkonen Revisited, 2003 FED. CTS. L. REV. 2 (2003); Jeffrey A. Parness & Matthew 
R. Walker, Enforcing Settlement in Federal Civil Actions, 36 IND. L. REV. 33 (2003). 
 194. Parness & Walker, supra note 193, at 38. 
 195. Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430, 1433 (9th Cir. 1995).  As it turned out, this 
declaration was not enough.  According to Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Insurance of America, 511 
U.S. 375 (1994), a judge’s czar status must appear in the settlement agreement.  A 2008 example of 
a czar/czarina provision, from a Release and Hold Harmless agreement supplied by Chief Judge Ann 
Aiken of the District of Oregon (on file with author): 
IT IS FURTHER UNDERSTOOD AND AGREED that any dispute regarding the terms 
of the settlement agreement shall be resolved by United States District Judge Michael R. 
Hogan. 
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As a policy matter, czar/czarina provisions recognize that disagreements 
between the parties about the consented-to agreement may arise for a 
number of reasons and may tempt the parties to embark upon additional, and 
possibly destructive, litigation.  With this in mind, parties use czar/czarina 
provisions to make willing concessions of autonomy in exchange for the 
benefits of targeted and impartial judicial intervention.196  Although 
czar/czarina provisions assume judicial involvement in the settlement 
context and are therefore not relevant in all alternative contexts (e.g., small 
claims mediation), they represent a context improvement that can provide 
more stability to private consensus-based agreements. 
These improve-the-context ideas are appealing in part because they do 
not require much by way of initiative from the parties themselves.  Like all 
process improvements, these ideas seek to direct participants in particular 
ways by limiting options and encouraging⎯or discouraging⎯ certain 
behaviors.  Promulgating uniform rules and standards around mediation, 
creating eligibility standards for court-connected mediators, and funneling 
interpretation disputes directly back to a judge are all examples of 
reengineering the context so that the ignorant participant is less exposed to 
luck distortions in alternative processes. 
In addition, context improvements create new opportunities for 
participants to learn about and internalize what it means to participate 
authentically in the process.  Legal information from the mediator may raise 
a party’s awareness of his or her rights.  A three-day cooling-off period may 
encourage disputants to reflect on their decisions, and presumably ask their 
lawyers to review their newly mediated agreement.  Of course, whether 
parties are capable in the stressful moment of mediation to appreciate the 
legal information from the mediator, or whether they actually avail 
themselves of additional time after making the agreement, are open 
questions beyond the scope of context improvements. 
But really, if we are expecting most unrepresented participants to use 
this extra space to seek the counsel of a lawyer and thus make their consent 
more educated and meaningful, we are fooling ourselves. As Nolan-Haley 
writes, simply reminding parties that they should consult lawyers before 
agreeing to anything may be “disingenuous[,] given the pervasive inability 
 
 196. Judge Aiken also points out that in addition to preventing disputants from litigating 
interpretive differences later, czar/czarina provisions ensure that the pre-agreement drafting process 
is not marred by gamesmanship but instead captures the intention of the agreement.  See Email from 
Ann Aiken, supra note 193. 
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to afford lawyers.”197  Perhaps these improve-the-mediator and improve-the-
context ideas can be rounded out by another set of ideas around improving 
participants. 
C. Improving Participants 
What do church basements and the Constitution have in common?  
According to constitutional law professor and legal journalist, Garrett Epps, 
church basements and the Constitution together create an opportunity for 
raising legal consciousness, enlightened or otherwise, of everyday people: 
In October I spent a crisp Saturday in the windowless basement of a suburban Virginia 
church attending a seminar on “The Substance and Meaning of the Constitution.”  I was 
told the secrets the “elite” have concealed from the people: the Constitution is based on 
the Law of Moses; Mosaic law was brought to the West by the ancient Anglo-Saxons, 
who were probably the Ten Lost Tribes of Israel; the Constitution restores the fifth-
century kingdom of the Anglo-Saxons. . . . These were earnest citizens who had come to 
learn about America and its Constitution.  What they were being taught was poisonous 
rubbish.198 
Non-lawyers cannot just pick up the Constitution and figure out how 
constitutional law works today.  An educated understanding of constitutional 
law requires background and analytical frameworks before one can start a 
meaningful study of our country’s foundational document.  This may seem 
like an unfortunate anti-populist development, but as Epps points out, this is 
indeed how non-lawyers are learning about the Constitution now—by 
listening to arguments made by experts with agendas.  He concludes that to 
the extent we believe that non-lawyers are ignorant about the history and 
meaning of the Constitution, progressive law professors must take 
responsibility for reaching out as educators: 
Trapped in that ghastly church basement last year, I made a resolution that I would try to 
help rescue the Constitution from “constitutionalists.”.†.†. [I]f any group of citizens 
anywhere wants to meet in a church basement to discuss these issues, I will either go 
 
 197. Informed Consent, supra note 118, at 838; see also Amy G. Applegate & Connie J.A. 
Beck, Self-Represented Parties in Mediation: Fifty Years Later It Remains the Elephant in the Room, 
51 FAM. CT. REV. 87, 88 (2013) (providing reasons for rise in self-representation in family law, 
including cost of hiring attorneys; belief that the case is simple enough not to require an attorney; 
and fear of attorneys adding more conflict to the situation). 
 198. Garrett Epps, Stealing the Constitution, NATION, Jan. 20, 2011, available at 
www.thenation.com/print/article/157904/stealing-constitution. 
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there to help or try to find someone who will.  It’s time for progressive constitutional 
scholars to stop mumbling about deconstruction and speak up for democracy.199 
This Article argues that the ADR community has a similar problem: 
there is insufficient “consent literacy” (analogous to what might be 
described as the “constitutional law literacy” described above), and in the 
absence of positive information about concepts like consent and self-
determination, unrepresented participants in alternative processes are 
unlikely to engage meaningfully.  And so, like Epps’s promise about 
meeting in the church basement, the ADR community should consider 
whether there are untapped opportunities for public education that could 
improve participant understanding of alternative processes and, in particular, 
the primacy of self-determination and consent. 
Little legal scholarship exists in this area.  Public sector dispute 
resolution scholars and practitioners probably have made the most headway 
in promoting best practices for informing communities of upcoming large-
scale processes that may or may not include opportunities for public 
participation.200  But as noted above, most mainstream ADR proponents 
focus on context and mediator improvements, likely on the theory that a 
sound (not lucky) process will support the ordinary uninformed and 
unrepresented person in achieving self-determination and reaching just 
results.  This theory makes an important and questionable assumption—that 
people come into the process with the requisite legal consciousness and 
agency to participate meaningfully in determining their own interests and 
ends.201  On this view, seeking to educate the general public is not required, 
and even if it were desirable, it still might seem impracticable as a matter of 
system design.202 
What might “improving participants” look like, with the aim of making 
consent more meaningful and outcomes less lucky?  Nolan-Haley’s idea of 
having mediators provide legal information to participants is one possibility, 
in that having such information arguably raises awareness of one’s legal 
predicament and prerogatives.  Of course, a person’s ability to assimilate this 
 
 199. Id. 
 200. See, e.g., Field, supra note 182; see also LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND & JEFFREY L. 
CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING ROBERT’S RULES: THE NEW WAY TO RUN YOUR MEETING, BUILD 
CONSENSUS, AND GET RESULTS (2006) (developing new meeting norms that deemphasize 
procedural formalities and majority rule in favor of greater participation, information sharing, and 
consensus). 
 201. Note that this assumption of “consent literacy” implicates not only those historically 
marginalized and socioeconomically vulnerable groups that have been the concern of long-standing 
critiques of ADR, see sources cited supra note 16, but broader swaths of the population as well. 
 202. See Thinning Vision, supra note 116, at 81 (stating that it is not realistic to teach mass 
audiences about self-determination). 
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kind of information in the moment might be compromised by the psychic 
strain or cognitive overload posed by learning and participating at the same 
time.203  Welsh’s cooling-off period may ease this situation, but still only 
provides three days and takes place after the agreement is already penciled 
out, which may raise issues of sunk costs, loss aversion, or deal fatigue for 
participants.204 
Perhaps we can move beyond the immediate disputing environment 
(context and mediators) when thinking about how to help improve the 
participation of unrepresented people in alternative processes.  Epps’s 
church basement idea speaks to a more ambitious agenda for promoting 
justice in legal systems and processes through grassroots efforts of legal 
experts. 
With that in mind, this Article proposes radically reorienting the law 
school’s pedagogical focus toward external constituencies in the community.  
This would not be so much breaking from tradition as it would be using 
tradition to disrupt the relative insularity of law school communities.  Law 
libraries have long served as support networks for those appearing pro se,205 
and the legal clinic movement historically has striven to improve access to 
justice for vulnerable populations.206  But these services generally are not 
thought of as central to the law school’s pedagogical mission.  A radical 
 
 203. As noted before, the timing of new information plays an important role in comprehension 
and retention.  See sources cited supra note 181. 
 204. The “sunk-cost fallacy” refers to an individual’s tendency to use past investments as part 
(or all) of the rationale to continue investing in a project (“throwing good money after bad”).  
Charles W. Murdock & Barry Sullivan, What Kahneman Means for Lawyers: Some Reflections on 
Thinking, Fast and Slow, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1377, 1397 (2013).  Loss aversion is “the tendency of 
individuals to favor the status quo because they overestimate the possibility that an action will have 
negative consequences.”  Id. at 1394.  “Deal fatigue” can crop up when settlements take time.  See, 
e.g., J.Q. Newton Davis, Tips for a Successful Client M&A Strategy, ASPATORE, 2008 WL 8444328 
(2008) (arguing that deal fatigue can kill deals if no one takes responsibility for shepherding it 
through the process); see also FISHER & URY, supra note 64, at 57 (“All too often negotiators ‘leave 
money on the table’—they fail to reach agreement when they might have, or the agreement they do 
reach could have been better for each side.”). 
 205. “Equitable and permanent public access to legal information is the heart of law 
librarianship. Without equitable and permanent access to legal information, law librarians cannot 
continue to improve the quality of justice in our free and democratic society.”  Principles and Core 
Values Concerning Public Information on Government Websites, AM. ASS’N LAW LIBRARIES, 
ACCESS TO ELECTRONIC LEGAL INFORMATION COMM. (March 24, 2007), 
http://www.aallnet.org/main-menu/Advocacy/access/aeliccorevalues.pdf. 
 206. See, e.g., Julie Macfarlane, Bringing the Clinic into the 21st Century, 27 WINDSOR Y.B. 
ACCESS TO JUST. 35, 35 (2009). 
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reorientation must involve faculty, students, classes, and high-level 
administration, as well as the broader community. 
Law schools could do more, and in fact must do more because it is not 
clear who else will do it.  Consider this statement from a recent book on the 
Occupy movements in the United States: 
The corruption of the legal system—the ability of the state to make legal what was once 
illegal—is always the precursor to totalitarian rule.  The timidity of those tasked with 
protecting our Constitutional rights—the media, elected officials, judges, the one million 
lawyers in this country, and the thousands of law school professors and law school 
deans—means there is no internal mechanism with which to decry or prevent abuse.207 
Hedges and Sacco argue that public matters, which run alongside and 
are interwoven within the workings of the market, implicating law and 
politics are not just of interest to legal communities, but they impose 
responsibility on legal communities, particularly law schools, to cultivate 
and support public discourse and greater understanding.  This position aligns 
with Epps’s church basement position as well as the broader claim that non-
lawyers are starved for resources that would help them deal with the 
complexities of modern disputes and decision-making. 
What would fulfilling this responsibility mean in practice?  One 
possibility is offering classes to the public through the law school, taught by 
law faculty and/or students, or at a minimum creating informational 
handouts available at the entrance to the law library.208  Some state bar 
associations, for example, host “people’s law schools” at local law 
schools.209  These programs typically feature sessions with broad appeal, 
such as “Dealing with the I.R.S.” or landlord/tenant law.210  In addition to 
learning more about the legal landscape, offering general courses in 
alternative processes, problem solving, and conflict resolution would 
 
 207. CHRIS HEDGES & JOE SACCO, DAYS OF DESTRUCTION, DAYS OF REVOLT 240-41 (2012). 
 208. It sounds modest, but simply making more materials available through a trusted source, 
like a law school, could empower non-lawyers to represent themselves more authentically in 
alternative processes.  In addition to, or instead of, classes and clinics, law schools could produce 
(perhaps through research efforts of clinic students) handouts describing the values and principles of 
mediation and other alternative practices.  Law schools might also develop informational sheets of 
the sort Nolan-Haley envisioned in her work on informed consent.  The basics of landlord-tenant 
law, of debts and collections law, and of other common legal predicates in small claims mediation, 
for example, could be useful to unrepresented participants, especially those appearing opposite 
repeat players. Even a sheet with relevant websites would help. 
 209. The University of Texas School of Law, for example, has provided a “People’s Law 
School” in cooperation with the Austin Bar Association.  See People’s Law School Offers Free 
Legal Education, MAG. U. TEX. SCH. L., http://www.utexas.edu/law/magazine/2011/02/07/people’s-
law-school-offers-free-legal-education-february-26-2011-2/ (last visited Aug. 14, 2013). 
 210. See, e.g., People’s Law School Class Options, AUSTIN BAR ASS’N, 
http://www.austinbar.org/pages/PLS_Classes (last visited Aug. 14, 2013). 
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promote consent literacy.  Courses in mediation and negotiation would likely 
be popular (as they are in law school generally) and may foster cognitive and 
emotional awareness of concepts like consent and self-determination, even 
in the absence of an actual dispute.211 
Another possibility might be resituating the law school as a public 
meeting venue, either for meetings initiated from the outside (e.g., the city 
council scheduling a town hall) or for meetings attempting to respond to 
disruptive events (e.g., the law school announces a community-wide meeting 
to discuss gun violence).  Recasting the law school as a public space for 
community members would create more opportunities for discourse and 
exchange.  Additionally, having faculty members attend as participants and 
process guides would help provide a key learning experience and likely a 
more consent-supportive environment.212 
A third possibility could be developing more responsive, reality-based 
clinical offerings.  As Julie Macfarlane has argued, the traditional model of a 
rights-default, lawyer-controlled clinical model does not fit with modern 
legal needs of many clients.  Today, “[w]orking for social justice and 
equality” requires outreach not only in litigation capacities or 
institutionalized ADR but also in “community and group organizing, 
 
 211. Additionally, one could imagine online or other media-based resources developed by law 
schools that would be immensely useful to unrepresented participants in alternative processes 
because they could feature some of the brightest luminaries in our field addressing a wide variety of 
issues around consent and alternative practice.  One could imagine, for example, a short online 
presentation specifically about small claims mediation—what to expect, how to prepare, and why 
consent matters even in court-connected contexts.  One could likewise imagine a MOOC (massive 
open online course) on participating in multiparty complex decision-making that provides insight 
and guidance for all different roles in the process—not just for process guides and legal counsel.  
The work of Noam Ebner, a pioneer of online teaching of negotiation and alternative practices, could 
serve as a model for developing public-oriented curriculum.  See, e.g., Noam Ebner et al., You’ve 
Got Agreement: Negoti@ting via Email, 31 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 427 (2010).  Such 
resources could serve not only as stand-alone products of the legal academy but could also provide 
the basis for additional in-person conversations and trainings.  In the style of the “flipped 
classroom,” for example, law schools could screen the online talks for the public, followed by panel 
discussions and Q&A sessions. 
 212. For example, law schools and law faculty hosted a recent series of roundtables on the topic 
of mandatory arbitration.  The roundtables allowed participants to become better educated on the 
broad legal landscape, the priorities at stake, the truly difficult problems, and the low-hanging fruit.  
Perhaps having the roundtables at law schools encouraged participants to adopt a “school schema” 
and approach the issues with an open mind.  See Nancy A. Welsh & David B. Lipsky, “Moving the 
Ball Forward” in Consumer and Employment Dispute Resolution: What Can Planning, Talking, 
Listening and Breaking Bread Together Accomplish?, DISP. RESOL. MAG. Spring 2013, at 14 
(describing the rich learning environment cultivated by regular meetings facilitated by law faculty). 
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individual and group rights assertions, partisan negotiation and conflict 
resolution, and lobbying for law reform and policy alternatives.”213  
Macfarlane criticizes traditional legal clinics for hewing too closely to 
traditional adversarial models and missing opportunities for law students to 
learn how to bargain, how to settle, and how to build partnerships with 
clients.214  Alternative clinics are no better insofar as they focus primarily on 
training law students as mediators (which is, after all, not what most law 
students will be doing in their careers), and miss opportunities for law 
students to work with clients in developing process musculature outside of 
mediation settings.215  Why not create ADR clinics focusing on organizing 
protests and activist groups; on negotiation preparation; on lobbying and 
political bargains; on pre-mediation strategy (maybe in small claims settings 
working with unrepresented people); and on general skill-building for 
groups in the community? 
All of these ideas situate and reestablish the law school as a community 
center for public legal knowledge.216  Reinventing law schools as community 
knowledge centers would advance legal consciousness and culture—and 
thus promote higher quality consent in civil contexts—in at least two ways.  
One, the community-building benefits of a “people’s law school” or similar 
source of informational material, for example, would be enhanced by the 
inclusion of skill-building classes, trainings, and documents.  Not only are 
skills some of the most interesting and immediately useful acquisitions, but 
it would also hearten the community to see that future lawyers are learning 
creative problem solving, listening, empathy, client-centered processes, and 
so on.  Two, promoting the law school as a community resource will raise 
overall legal consciousness simply by creating a new public support 
organization for legal questions and concerns.  The existence of such an 
organization will encourage community members to think of themselves as 
active and empowered agents who have the resources at hand to manage 
legal situations that may arise—even if these same community members 
never actually set foot in the law school. 
 
 213. Macfarlane, supra note 206, at 46. 
 214. Id. at 47. 
 215. There are two notable examples of ADR clinics that are pushing the boundaries of what 
modern alternative practice looks like: Harvard Law School’s innovative Negotiation and Mediation 
Clinical Program (http://blogs.law.harvard.edu/hnmcp/) and Stanford Law School’s International 
Human Rights and Conflict Clinic (http://humanrightsclinic.law.stanford.edu). 
 216. I develop these suggestions in more practical detail in a forthcoming article. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
One might object that raising legal consciousness around consent 
through increased education and outreach is not enough.  Heightened 
consciousness will not, without more, make consent more valid in contracts 
of adhesion, or make consent more powerful in public collaborative 
processes or mitigate the luck and contingencies that accompany human 
endeavors.  That said, strengthening public understanding of what individual 
consent means, and identifying how modern legal regimes so often degrade 
that consent is surely a step toward fixing these problems.  Having more 
self-aware and higher quality consent in alternative dispute resolution not 
only makes agreements more valuable, but it also instills better civic habits 
that, in a democratic community, should promote better access to justice and 
less harmful fictions in legal rules. 
From intellectual, community, and administrative standpoints, law 
schools generally, and ADR faculty in particular, bear the responsibility for 
taking the lead on helping community members appreciate the significance 
of consent, especially their own consent, in civil processes and democracy 
writ large.  At present, law schools spend a great deal of time training 
process leaders (mediators, lawyers, policymakers) who are eventually 
supposed to facilitate the engagement of participants who are often 
unrepresented and/or unfamiliar with any kind of process, much less ever-
evolving alternative processes.  Training these process leaders happens in 
advance of any specific process or problem; students learn theory and 
principles absent real-life complexities, providing time and space for 
reflection and integration.  Similarly, law schools should seek to train the 
community generally, as part of civic engagement, and if possible, in 
advance of needing such training. 
Education is not a cure-all to luck distortions in civil settlements, and 
certainly the erosive, intractable problems of agency in legal systems will 
never go away.  That said, we are bound to do whatever we can to move us 
closer to real justice for people and away from lucky outcomes papered over 
by low-quality consents. 
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